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THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC AND MEDIA USE ON
TRADEMARK RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL ASS'N v. GTE
VANTAGE INC. AND "DUAL-USE" TERMS
Joseph E. Washington'
I. INTRODUCTION
Trademark owners must be cautious when dealing with public and me-
dia use of their trademarks.' The more popular a trademark becomes,
the more often individuals use it in ordinary discourse.2 While the
popularity of a trademark is generally positive for a trademark owner,3
+J.D. Candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See infra Parts V.C.1 to V.C.3 (discussing trademark owner concerns with public
and media use of their trademarks); see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:28, at 12-67 (West Group 4th ed. 1998)
(1996) (discussing the difficulties in policing public and media use of trademarks).
2. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 31:146, at 31-213 (stating that "[t]rademarks
form an important part of the public dialog on economic and social issues"); see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397-98 (1990) (describing trademarks as an
emerging "lingua franca"). For instance, through public discourse, a new dictionary
meaning may develop in a word or phrase apart from its meaning as a trademark. See Lu-
casfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.D.C. 1985) (refusing to enjoin pub-
lic interest groups from referring to the Strategic Defense Initiative as "Star Wars" be-
cause a new meaning had attached to the term outside of its trademark meaning); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2, at 3-4 (discussing Lucasfilm and the changing meaning of
words). For example, the trademark "SPAM" for the processed lunch meat manufactured
by Hormel Foods Corp., has taken on a new meaning in ordinary discourse as a term re-
ferring to unsolicited or "junk" electronic mail. See Hormel Objects to Cyber Promotions'
Use of 'SPAM' Mark, 1997 COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., 24,432, 24,432.
3. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:12, at 3-25 (noting that trademarks are a
prime advertising tool which generate increased sales). Now, trademarks are often com-
modities in and of themselves. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 960, 961 (1993) (describing how trademarks are often as valuable as the products to
which they are attached). Merchandising and character licensing has become big business,
as trademark owners often license their trademarks for use on different products. See
GREGORY J. BATrERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND
CHARACTER LICENSING § 1.02 (1998) (discussing, for example, how the recreational ve-
hicle manufacturer Winnebago Industries has licensed its trademark "Winnebago" for use
on sleeping bags, tents, and other outdoor gear in order to expand its sales base). It is not
uncommon to see items such as t-shirts and baseball caps bearing famous trademarks. See
Kozinski, supra, at 961-62 (citing as an example beer trademarks used on t-shirts). Some
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the frequent use of its trademark by the media or by individuals in public• 4
discourse can influence how others interpret a particular trademark. For
example, if the public begins to use a trademark to identify a particular
type of product and not as the brand name, the mark will become the ge-
neric name of that product.5 Generic names, however, will not be pro-
tected as trademarks.6
The primary purpose of a trademark is to identify the source of the
goods to which the mark is attached.7 If for some reason the trademark
loses its ability to point to a particular source, it will cease to function as
a trademark; as a result, the courts will label it a generic term and will
not protect it.8 Therefore, trademark owners want their mark to act as a
psychological symbol pointing to a particular source of the goods or
services.9
people may wear these items in order to express their brand loyalties, while others wear
these items to make a statement about themselves. See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 402 (dis-
cussing the "'surplus value"' of a trademark apart from its value as a source identifier);
Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the
Public Domain-With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993) (discussing trademarks as status symbols).
4. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2, at 3-4 (stating that often the meaning of a
word changes according to its use); see also Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)
(stating that "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used") (citation omitted).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579-80 (2d
Cir. 1963) (holding that "thermos" had become generic because of the company's wide-
spread generic usage of its mark and its failure to stop misuse by others), modified, 320 F.
Supp. 1156 (D. Conn. 1970); infra Part II.A (discussing generic terms). But see infra note
327 and accompanying text (stating that owners of marks held to be generic may be enti-
tled to injunctive relief designed to minimize possible confusion caused by the defendant's
use of the generic mark). A trademark is not an absolute property right like a patent or
copyright because trademark rights require positive action on the part of the trademark
owner to keep the trademark rights in force. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359,
368 (1924) (holding that a trademark does not confer an absolute ownership right to "the
word or words" that are protected). Patents require actions of a technical manner on the
part of their owners in order to keep their rights in force. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (1996)
(stating that a patent will expire if certain requirements are not met). For example, the
payment of three maintenance fees due at three and a half years, seven and a half years,
and eleven and a half years from the grant date of the patent are required to keep the pat-
ent in force. See id.
7. See Johnson & Johnson v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
790, 791 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (stating that "the function of a trademark is to identify a single,
albeit anonymous source").
8. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
(stating that generic terms are not protectable trademarks).
9. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (stating that trademarks act as a psychological symbol for the consumer).
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Currently, there are few trademark cases that focus on the effects of
public and media use of trademarks outside of the generic terms context.
There are however, several cases that recognize trademark-like rights re-
sulting from public and media use of identifying terms.'0 Courts have
granted protection to abbreviated forms of well-known trademarks and
consumer coined nicknames for products and services, even though the
trademark owner never used the abbreviation or nickname on its goods
or services." Typically, trademark rights are acquired by an owner only
after actual use in commerce of the mark on goods or services." On oc-
casion, however, courts have protected both a trademark owner's good-
will and a consumer's perceptions by preventing a potential user from
confusing consumers who had come to associate the contested mark with
the owner; this is true even if the owner never used the purported mark
on its goods or to identify its services."
Cases centering on the subject of public and media use of trademarks
illustrate how courts recognize and protect consumer perceptions.4 In
1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recog-
nized the role of consumer perceptions in Illinois High School Ass'n v.
GTE Vantage Inc.;5 the court declared that it was protecting effective
communication by introducing the "dual-use" rights concept into trade-
mark law. 16 The plaintiff, Illinois High School Association (IHSA), had
used the trademark "March Madness" since the early 1940s in connec-
tion with its high school basketball tournament.7 The defendant, GTE
10. See infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 (discussing public association cases). In these
cases, the public had modified or created a term to identify the trademark owners' goods
or services. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (granting
trademark rights to Coca-Cola in the term "Koke" due to public association); Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Thermo-Chem Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 562
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (granting trademark rights to Volkswagen in the term "BUG" due to
public association).
11. See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2 (discussing the trademark protections afforded ab-
breviations and nicknames for trademarks created by the public or media).
12. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768, 1772
(T.T.A.B. 1994) (holding that a trademark must be used in connection with goods to es-
tablish trademark rights).
13. See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2 (discussing the trademark protection afforded ab-
breviations and nicknames of trademarks adopted by the public).
14. See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2 (discussing trademark protection afforded abbre-
viations and nicknames for trademarks). Consumer perceptions are protected most often
in the generic terms context. See infra Part I.A (discussing public perceptions and generic
terms).
15. 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
16. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
17. See id. at 245; see also infra Part IV (discussing in detail the facts of Illinois High
Sch. Ass'n and the Seventh Circuit's opinion).
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Vantage, used "March Madness" under a license from the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in connection with a CD-ROM
game dealing with NCAA college basketball. 8 The Seventh Circuit up-
held the denial of IHSA's request for an injunction forbidding GTE Van-
tage from using the term." The Court held that IHSA had no trademark
rights to protect against GTE Vantage's use because, through wide-
spread media usage, the public had come to associate the term "March
Madness" almost exclusively with the NCAA basketball tournament
televised nationally each year."'
Judge Posner held that IHSA's mark no longer served to exclusively
identify its high school basketball tournament and, in effect, declared
that it was generic.' The term "March Madness" however, cannot be
called generic in a true sense because it is not a synonym for all basket-
22ball tournaments held in March.
To confuse matters further, Judge Posner concluded his opinion by
stating, "[w]e do not opine on the scope of the trademark rights that ei-
ther IHSA or NCAA has, beyond ruling that IHSA's rights do not ex-
tend to the NCAA tournament and to merchandise such as Vantage's
game that is sold in connection with that tournament., 23 If "March Mad-
ness" is truly a generic term, then this statement makes little sense; nei-
ther IHSA nor the NCAA could have any trademark rights in a generic
term because such terms are not protectable as trademarks.24 Based on
Judge Posner's closing statement, the Seventh Circuit did not completely
foreclose legal protection of the term "March Madness.,
25
One interpretation of the Seventh Circuit's holding is that IHSA sim-
ply did not have sufficient rights to stop the use of "March Madness" as
licensed by the NCAA to GTE Vantage. 2' Another view, which the par-
18. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245.




23. Id. at 248.
24. See infra Part I.A (discussing generic terms).
25. See Richard E. Stanley, Jr., Comment, Reverse Confusion as Applied in Dream
Team Collectibles, Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, and Illinois High School As-
sociation, 50 BAYLOR L. R. 1007, 1025 (1998) (arguing that IHSA and the NCAA retained
trademark rights to the term "March Madness" to enforce against others, but not against
each other); Bart A. Lazar & Thomas A. Volz, Owners Must Police Marks Diligently,
NAT'L L. J., May 12, 1997, at C5 (stating that the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "the
mark was not devoid of any value to either the NCAA or the IHSA.").
26. See Richards v. Cable News Network, Inc., 15 F. Supp.2d 683, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(stating that the Seventh Circuit found "March Madness" to be generic). Other views
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ties addressed in their post-Seventh Circuit briefs before the Supreme
Court and which the district court incorporated in its opinion, was that
the NCAA had acquired common law trademark rights through media
and public use of the term.27 In this author's view, the Seventh Circuit
did not declare that "March Madness" was not entitled to any legal pro-
tection. It held merely that IHSA could not stop the NCAA, through its
licensor, the GTE Advantage, from using "March Madness" in connec-
tion with the NCAA Tournament. 28 Presumably, IHSA and the NCAA
still are entitled to stop others from using "March Madness" in connnec-
tion with goods and services related to their respective tournaments.
29
Viewed from any of these perspectives, the Seventh Circuit allowed
both entities to continue using the mark. ° It therefore could be said that
the court created a "dual-use" mark, one which both IHSA and NCAA
could use for their respective tournaments." This result is not attractive
as most trademark owners do not want to lose or share trademark
rights. 2 The decision suggests, therefore, that trademark owners should
be diligent in policing the use of their trademarks by others or risk losing
protection of their trademark rights.33
As a result of the Seventh Circuit's creation of "dual-use" rights, two
have been expressed on the meaning of the Illinois High School Ass'n decision. See 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:94, at 24-161 n.3 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision
in terms of "dilution by blurring," which is described as "a proliferation of borrowings that
.. . deprive the mark of its distinctiveness" and, therefore, its strength); Anthony L.
Fletcher & David J. Kera, United States: The Fiftieth Year of Administration of the Lan-
ham Trademark Act of 1946, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 741, 797 (1997) (stating that the out-
come turned on the issue of abandonment).
27. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., No. 96-1119, at 104 (C.D. Ill.
March 20, 1996) (hearing on motion for preliminary injunction); Respondent's Brief in
Opposition at 8-9, Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir.
1996) (No. 96-1981) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
9-10, Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-
1981) [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari].
28. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 248.
29. See Lazar & Volz, supra note 25, at C5.
30. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 248 (refusing both to enjoin GTE Vantage
and to opine on the scope of the trademark rights of IHSA and the NCAA); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 8-9 (stating that the Seventh Circuit created a "joint
tenancy" of the mark by IHSA and the NCAA).
31. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 27, at 8-9.
32. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
(stating that generic terms are not protectable trademarks); Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 27, at 8-9 (stating that a "joint tenancy" will destroy the source denoting
function of trademarks and, as a result, will cause consumer confusion).
33. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. The opinion cautions trademark
owners that they must be "assiduous" in protecting their marks. See id.
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entirely separate trademark owners now may have rights to use the same
trademark, if the public associates the mark with more than one owner.
4
In deciding this way, the Seventh Circuit's holding clashed with estab-
lished trademark principles, most obviously with the time-tested princi-
ple that trademarks designate only a single source.35
Moreover, because trademark owners should police the use of their
own trademarks diligently to retain full protection, they now have to fear
not only generic usage of their marks, but also media and public usage
that may compromise the owner's rights in favor of others." Prior to Illi-
nois High School Ass'n, trademark owners had less to fear regarding
non-commercial uses of their trademarks.37 Now, in addition to address-
ing generic issues, the cautious trademark owner should address and
challenge non-commercial uses of its mark to guard against another ac-
quiring "dual-use" trademark rights. 8 At present, however, there is un-
certainty as to what actions a trademark owner must take to protect its
mark from becoming a "dual-use" term.39
34. See id. at 247.
35. See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918)
(a trademark must point to a "single, though anonymous, maker"); 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 3:9, at 3-17 to 3-18 (discussing the principle that trademarks designate a single
source). Presently, Congress does permit concurrent use trademark rights, but these rights
may be granted only for separate regions and only when confusion is unlikely. See 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994) (detailing the requirements for concurrent registrations); 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 20:82, at 20-129 (discussing concurrent use registrations).
The Seventh Circuit opinion did not address concurrent use rights, however, and held that
two separate entities were allowed to use the same mark in overlapping territories. See
Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247-48.
36. See id. at 246-47; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 8.
37. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 12 (stating that trademark
owners traditionally have not feared non-commercial use); see also Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High
Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that the media's use of "STAR
WARS" to denote the Strategic Defense Initiative did not affect the plaintiff's exclusive
trademark rights in "STAR WARS" within the entertainment field).
38. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246; see also Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 27 at 10-13. In Illinois High School Association, the IHSA waited a long
time to challenge the media's use of "March Madness" in connection with the NCAA
tournament. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246; see also Illinois High Sch. Ass'n
v. GTE Vantage Inc., No. 96-1119, at 98, 100 (C.D. I11. March 20, 1996) (hearing on motion
for preliminary injunction). The district court and Seventh Circuit weighed this fact heav-
ily in considering whether to deny the injunction. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at
246-47 (admonishing IHSA for not being "assiduous" in protecting its rights); see also Illi-
nois High Sch. Ass'n, No. 96-1119, at 98, 100 (hearing on motion for preliminary injunc-
tion).
39. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Illinois High School Association at 12, Illinois
High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1981) [hereinaf-
ter Brief of Illinois High School Association] (stating that the First Amendment limits the
actions a trademark holder can take against the media). This is also the case with generic
[48:605
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In holding that "March Madness" was a "dual-use" term, the Seventh
Circuit also recognized the importance that public association plays in
trademark protection.4 The interests of effective public communication
could be furthered only by refusing to enjoin GTE Vantage and, thereby,
recognizing that the NCAA also had rights to use the mark because a
clear majority of the public associated "March Madness" with the NCAA
tournament.4' In future cases where similar issues arise, courts will need
to formulate an appropriate balancing test to decide whether the inter-
ests of effective communication will support the labeling of a term as
"dual-use."
42
The Seventh Circuit's opinion has been criticized for "turn[ing] trade-
mark law on its head., 43 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the deci-
sion is the scant treatment that the Seventh Circuit gave to existing
terms. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:28, at 12-67 (stating that there is "no sure le-
gal remedy" against the media in the generic terms and dilution contexts). But see Stuart
I. Graff, Could Mark Owners Sue Media for Generic Use?, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 19, 1998, at
C6 (stating that in some circumstances, trademark owners could maintain actions against
the media for generic usage or dilution).
40. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247. A trademark owner cannot "with-
draw from the public domain a name that the public is using to denote someone else's
good or service, leaving that someone and his customers speechless." Id.
41. See id.; see also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleeping Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95,
101 (2d Cir. 1989) (implying that public perception should not be ignored once public as-
sociation has occurred). It was easy for the court to decide Illinois High School Ass'n on
this theory because public association so strongly favored the NCAA, even though IHSA
had used the mark to some degree for a long period of time prior to the NCAA's adoption
of the term. Cf Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-48. It is interesting to note that
"March Madness" was not alleged to be a "descriptive" mark. See generally id.; infra
notes 57-60 (discussing descriptive terms and secondary meaning). Typically, courts meas-
ure only the amount of public association when deciding whether, for a descriptive mark,
the trademark owner has proven secondary meaning-consumers' association of a parti-
clar mark with a particular source. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing secondary meaning). Outside of the secondary meaning context, this aspect of the case
is novel, as no court appears ever to have used the strength of public association as a de-
terminative factor in a trademark dispute. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247
(stating that this case involved a novel issue of trademark law in the Seventh Circuit);
Wallpaper Mfgrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 762 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(stating that "[t]rademark rights are neither acquired nor lost on the basis of comparative
popularity"); Jason R. Wolfersberger, Recent Developments, Illinois High School Asso-
ciation v. GTE Vantage, Inc.: Dual-Use Classification Threatens the Extinction of Amer-
ica's Small Trademark Holder, 32 GA. L. REV. 363, 383 (1997) (arguing that "the Seventh
Circuit bypassed the traditional analysis" in deciding issues of trademark protection).
42. See infra Part VI.A-B (arguing that future courts should balance the need for ef-
fective communication in conducting their analyses).
43. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 13; see also Wolfersberger, su-
pra note 41, at 389-90 (arguing that the Illinois High School Association decision "circum-
vented traditional trademark analysis" and is unsupported by legal precedent).
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trademark precedent. 4 The court was quick to strike down the rights of
a small trademark holder in the face of a more powerful entity;4 this
facet of the case struck a chord with those who see the decision as ham-
46pering or even destroying the rights of small trademark owners.
The purpose of this Comment is not to dismiss Illinois High School
Ass'n as a mere aberration or to argue that the case was decided wrongly.
Rather, this Comment's sole objective is to explore the underlying ra-
tionale of the decision and to develop a framework for addressing future
"dual-use" cases. This Comment first discusses the relevance of public
association, strength of trademarks, and other principles of trademark
law necessary for an analysis of the decision in Illinois High School
Ass'n. This Comment then outlines court decisions involving media and
public use of trademarks to provide a framework for analyzing the deci-
sion. Next, this Comment examines the decision in Illinois High School
Ass'n by analyzing the nature of "dual-use" classification as announced
by the Seventh Circuit. This Comment then attempts to reconcile the
decision with existing trademark precedent and focuses on Judge Pos-
ner's creation of the novel "dual-use" categorization and his "assimila-
tion" of those terms to previously existing generic terms. This Comment
then discusses some of the issues involved with recognizing trademark
rights in users of "dual-use" terms, including the rights of each "dual-
user" and free speech concerns. Finally, this Comment argues that fu-
ture courts should analyze the likelihood of confusion before fashioning
appropriate relief.
II. TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ASSOCIATION
The Lanham Act of 194641 governs federal trademark law and provides
for the federal protection and registration of trademarks.48 It also pro-
vides legal remedies for the infringement of federally registered trade
44. See Wolfersberger, supra note 41, at 383-89; see also infra Part V.B (discussing the
difficulties with the "dual-use" classification).
45. See Wolfersberger, supra note 41, at 389-91.
46. See id. The decision also can be viewed as a classic example of "outcome-based
judicial reasoning." See id. at 389; see also Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 248 (stating
that the suit appeared to lack any merit).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
48. See id. §§ 1051, 1114, 1125.
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marks, as well as unregistered trademarks.' ° Trademark rights also can
arise under state common law"1 and statutes providing for state registra-
52tion.
The primary purpose of a trademark is to serve as a designator of a1 3
source of goods or services. Certain types of words are better suited for
this purpose and, therefore, the selection and maintenance of words or
symbols to serve as trademarks bears heavily on the protection that a
49. See id. § 1114. Federally registered trademarks are protected against infringe-
ment by section 32 of the Lanham Act, which provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in com-
merce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy,
or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, recepta-
cles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the reme-
dies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not
be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed
with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id.
50. See id. § 1125(a). Unregistered trademarks are protected against infringement by
section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, which provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading de-
scription of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-(A) is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
act.
Id.
51. See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674
(1901) (recognizing common law trademark rights).
52. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 22:1, at 22-2 to 22-6 (discussing state registra-
tion of trademarks). State trademark law exists to protect marks used only within a par-
ticular state. See id.
53. See Johnson & Johnson v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
790, 791 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (stating that the function of a trademark is to identify "a single,
albeit anonymous, source").
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court will afford an owner in a trademark infringement action. 4
Trademarks are grouped into two categories: "inherently distinctive"
and "non-inherently distinctive" trademarks.5 The first category, "in-
herently distinctive" trademarks, includes "suggestive, arbitrary and fan-
ciful" marks which, by definition, serve to identify the source without
more. 6 The second category, "non-inherently distinctive" trademarks,
includes descriptive marks, which are words that describe the "qualities,
ingredients, or characteristics of [the] product" to which the mark is ap-
plied. 7 Descriptive marks are deemed "non-inherently distinctive" be-
cause they cannot function immediately as an identifier of source; there-
fore, descriptive marks require proof of "secondary meaning" to be
protected as a mark. 8 Secondary meaning is an association in the minds
of the public that leads them to believe the primary significance of the
term is as a reference to the source of the product instead of merely de-
scribing a feature of the product or the product itself. 9 Thus, to establish
54. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:2, at 11-5 to 11-7. All word marks fit on a
spectrum of distinctiveness which determines the mark's inherent strength. See id.
Trademark protection is relative to strength. See id. § 11:73, at 11-128 to 11-129; see also
infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the spectrum of distinctiveness of
trademarks).
55. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:2, at 11-5 to 11-7.
56. See id. Fanciful marks are newly invented words that have been created to serve
as a trademark. See id. § 11:5, at 11-11; see also id. § 11:8, at 11-13 to 11-14 (citing
CLOROX and KODAK as examples). Arbitrary marks are common dictionary words
that, when used to designate goods and services, "neither suggest nor describe any [attrib-
ute] of [the] goods or services." Id. § 11:11, at 11-15 to 11-16; see also id. § 11:13, at 11-17
(citing ARROW for liqueurs and CONGRESS for spring water as examples).
57. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:15, at 11-19.
58. See id.; see also id. § 11:24, at 11-30 to 11-31 (using BEER NUTS for salted nuts
and BUFFERIN for buffered aspirin as examples). See generally Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (identifying generic, descriptive,
suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful trademarks and their eligibility for trademark protec-
tion).
59. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). Typi-
cally, proof of secondary meaning requires the use of the trademark on or in connection
with goods and services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994) (stating that "[t]he Commissioner
may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in
connection with the applicant's goods in commerce"). Some courts, however, have held
that pre-release or pre-sales publicity can establish secondary meaning. See New West
Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that pre-sales pub-
licity for magazine "New West" was sufficient to establish trademark rights); Walt Disney
Prods. v. Kusan, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 287 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that pre-
release publicity for the movie "The Black Hole" was sufficient to establish trademark
rights). The court in Illinois High School Association did not label "March Madness" a
descriptive term, therefore, secondary meaning arguably should not be a consideration.
See generally Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997); see also Wolfersberger, supra note 41, at 376-77
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secondary meaning, the trademark owner must establish that the public
associates the mark with a particular source.6° In addition, in deciding
the ownership priority6 of a trademark that requires secondary meaning,
courts must determine whether the plaintiff had acquired secondary
meaning in its mark at the time and in the market where the defendant
commenced use of the mark.62
Underlying these classifications is the public's interest in effective
communication. 63 For example, when a mark becomes the generic name
of a product, a trademark owner's continued monopoly on the right to
use the term disadvantages competitors in that they are prohibited from
using the true name of their product in describing it to consumers. 64 The
same can be said for protecting descriptive marks, in that granting exclu-
sive rights to these marks hampers trademark owners from describing
features of the product to consumers." Descriptive terms merely inform
consumers of certain qualities of a product and, because many other
products will have similar qualities, the use of a descriptive term as a
trademark will not aid the consumer in distinguishing products of differ-
ent sellers.66 These terms often either praise or merely inform the con-
sumer about the nature of the product.67 Likewise, if third parties use the
(arguing that IHSA's mark was inherently distinctive and that secondary meaning should
not apply). Instead, the court applied the related concept of public association to reach a
similar result with respect to "March Madness," which is arguably an inherently distinctive
trademark. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; Wolfersberger, supra note 41, at
376.
60. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir.
1970) (holding that the trademark owner must establish secondary meaning in a descrip-
tive mark before it can prove infringement). In determining whether the trademark owner
has established secondary meaning, courts often measure "the effectiveness of the effort
to create it." Id.
61. See infra Part III.B (discussing the relevance of priority of use in trademark law).
62. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3d Cir.
1978) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that it acquired secondary meaning in
the defendant's market first); National Color Labs, Inc. v. Philip's Foto Co., 273 F. Supp.
1002, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that mere priority of use does not give the plaintiff
rights to a mark).
63. See infra Part II.A (discussing the policy reasons against trademark protection of
generic terms).
64. See infra Part II.A (discussing why generic terms are not protected as trade-
marks).
65. Cf. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543-
45 (1920) (holding that other trademark owners must be allowed to use descriptive terms
to describe their products).
66. See Devcon Corp. v. Woodhill Chem. Sales Corp., 455 F.2d 830, 832 (1st Cir.
1972).
67. See, e.g., id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:18, at 11-23.
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same mark on similar goods, the mark will not be very distinctive. The
use of the same mark by many is unlikely to confuse because consumers
may learn to differentiate, carefully picking one product from the other.69
Therefore, if there is enough third party use, courts will hold that the
mark has ceased to function as a trademark.7 °
The courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) con-
sider evidence of third party use in determining whether there is a likeli-
hood of confusion between competing marks.71 If such evidence shows
that third parties are using trademarks containing a common term, courts
hold that such evidence is sufficient to suggest that purchasers have been
conditioned to look to the other elements of the marks in order to distin-
72guish the source of goods or services.
A. Public and Media Use: The Generic Terms and Dilution Context
News commentators, book publishers, and other "lexicographically in-
fluential" people have the ability to affect the consumer's perception of
what a trademark means.73 In determining whether a trademark desig-
nates a source, a court asks "[w]hat do the buyers understand by the
word for whose use the parties are contending?7 4 "If [the term] does not
relate exclusively to the trademark owner's product,"75 such as when con-
sumers view the term as the name of the product itself, the mark will be
labeled as a generic term." For example, a generic product name like the
68. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:85, at 11-144 to 11-145 (discussing the rela-
tionship between strength and third party use).
69. See id.§ 11:85, at 11-144.
70. See id. § 11:85, atll-144 to 11-145.
71. See Lloyd's Food Prods. Inc. v. Eli's, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that trademark use search reports, telephone directory listings, and advertise-
ments may be considered in determining the strength of a service mark); In re Broadway
Chicken, Inc., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1559, 1564-65 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (holding that trade-
mark use search reports and telephone directories were competent to show third party use
of a common term).
72. See Broadway Chicken, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1565-66 (holding that evidence of wide-
spread third party use of term "Broadway" as a common element in numerous marks used
in connection with restaurant services established an unlikelihood of consumer confusion).
73. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n. v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997); see also infra Part V.C.1-3 (discussing the free speech
issues involved with state trademarks).
74. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Judge Learned
Hand posed this famous question in Bayer and it soon became the test for determining
whether a mark was generic. See id.; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:4, at 12-9.
75. New Kids On The Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1992).
76. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:1, at 12-4.
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word "car" can never function as a trademark for an automobile, because
the word "car" is a name for the product itself and it does not identify
the source of the automobile." A generic term can never function as a
trademark because public policy dictates that these terms belong to the
78public domain. If not, competitors would be put at a disadvantage be-
cause they could not use the generic name of the product to describe
their goods to consumers. 79 Denying trademark protection to such terms
"allays fears that [companies] will [appropriate all] useful words" and at-
tempt to "assert[] exclusive rights [to] them." 8  There are numerous
cases where courts have denied protection because a mark was generic."'
A trademark also can lose its ability to denote its source through dilu-
77. See id. § 12:2, at 12-6 to 12-8. Often times, such cases dealing with generic terms
relate to newer products where the producer failed to create both a name for the product
itself and a brand name for the product. See id. § 12:25, at 12-60 to 12-62. Thus, when a
producer selects only a trademark for the product, the public will have nothing other than
the trademark itself to identify the product. See id. Such a trademark is likely to become
generic. See, e.g. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938) (holding
"Shredded Wheat" to be the generic name of the type of cereal); DuPont Cellophane Co.
v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that "Cellophane" was the ge-
neric name of the product).
78. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:2, at 12-5 (stating that "generic terms are
free for all to use"); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d
Cir. 1976) (stating that affording protection to a generic term would grant a monopoly on
a word in the English language).
79. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:2, at 12-6 to 12-7 (discussing the public pol-
icy concerns in denying protection to generic terms). A generic term will not be protected
regardless of how much money was spent on promoting the product. See Abercrombie &
Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. The money and effort are irrelevant because competing manufactur-
ers have a right to call their product by its name. See id.
80. New Kids On The Block, 971 F.2d at 306 (stating "the primary cost of recognizing
property rights in trademarks is the removal of words from (or perhaps non-entrance into)
our language").
81. See Reese Publ'g Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 10-11
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding "Video Buyer's Guide" to be generic for television related maga-
zines); Alchemy II, Inc. v. Yes! Entertainment Corp., 844 F. Supp. 560, 569 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (holding "Teddy" to be generic for teddy bears); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Ameri-
can Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (holding "trampoline" to be
generic for a piece of gymnastic equipment); see also generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note
1, § 12:18, at 12-35 to 12-45 (providing an illustrative list of trademarks held to be generic).
A trademark can, however, be generic in one context and a valid trademark in another.
For instance, in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), a United States
federal district court held the term "ASPIRIN" to be generic with respect to the general
public, yet a valid trademark with respect to pharmacists. See id. at 510. The court rea-
soned that, to the pharmacists, the term "ASPIRIN" still meant the plaintiff's brand. See
id. The court said that giving Bayer a monopoly on the word "ASPIRIN" would deprive
the trade of "the right effectually to dispose of the drug by the only description which will
be understood." Id. at 514.
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tion.8 When a trademark no longer signifies anything unique or par-
ticular, but rather refers to various things from various sources, dilution
has occurred." Improper use of a trademark by third parties can cause
the dilution of that mark."4 State dilution statutes have existed for some
time15 and, in 1995, Congress enacted a federal dilution statute." There
is, however, no cause of action under the new federal anti-dilution stat-
ute against non-commercial uses of trademarks. 7 Thus, trademark own-
ers must take other action against trademark misuse by the public and
the media to protect themselves against any loss of rights due to generic
usage and dilution.8 It is relatively uncertain, however, just what legal
actions a trademark owner may utilize to stop such trademark misuse.s9
A trademark owner's ability to stop use that may cause a mark to be-
come generic or diluted depends on who is using the trademark and in
what manner.9° A trademark owner will have a cause of action under
82. See Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964)
(enjoining the defendant from using "Tiffany's" for its restaurant services); see also 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:71, at 24-121 to 24-122 (discussing how dilution occurs). In
Tiffany & Co., the Massachusetts federal court described the type of injury caused by dilu-
tion as follows: "The risk of detraction may be a risk of an erosion of the public's identifi-
cation of this very strong mark with the plaintiff alone, thus diminishing its distinctiveness,
uniqueness, effectiveness, and prestigious connotations ...." Tiffany & Co., 231 F. Supp.
at 844.
83. See Tiffany & Co., 231 F. Supp. at 844; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:71, at 24-
121 to 24-122; see also Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Ration-
ale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 308 (1984) (ex-
plaining the dilution process). This form of dilution is known as dilution by "blurring."
See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1983). Dilution also
can occur by "tarnishment," where the effect of the defendant's conduct is to tarnish or
degrade the plaintiff's mark. Cf Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding plaintiffs mark tarnished by defendant's humorous depiction in compara-
tive advertisement).
84. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:76, at 24-128.
85. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (Deering 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN., ch. l0B, §12 (West 1990). See generally Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute:
Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108, 109-10 (1993) (discussing state dilution laws).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. II 1997). The plaintiff's mark must be "famous" to
receive protection under this section of the Lanham Act. See id.
87. See id. § 1125(c)(4)(b) (Supp. 11 1997). This subsection expressly excludes the
following: (1) fair use of a trademark in comparative advertising; (2) non-commercial use
and; (3) all forms of news reporting and news commentary from a cause of action under
the federal anti-dilution statute. See id.; see also Cyd B. Wolf, Trademark Dilution: The
Need for Reform, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 311, 321 (1984) (arguing that anti-dilution law
should be adapted to provide a basis for a cause of action for the generic misuse of trade-
marks).
88. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing free speech issues and generic terms).
89. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing remedies against the media).
90. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act against one that uses its mark in
a commercial manner.9' These two provisions of the federal trademark
statute preserve the primary function of trademark law: preventing con-
fusion in the marketplace. 92 In the usual case, a court can order an in-
junction or possibly monetary damages to stop the infringing commercial
use before any real harm is done to the mark's ability to designate a
source.93 Thus, trademark owners have an effective tool to stop commer-
cial use of their marks that might affect the mark's distinctiveness or
ability to denote its source.94
Unfortunately for the trademark owner, non-commercial use can be
just as damaging to a mark's ability to denote its source as commercial
use. 9' For example, when the public or the media uses the mark in a non-
commercial way, such as part of a communicative message, the trade-
mark owner is often powerless to prevent the use.96
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (requiring infringing activity to be "in commerce");
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. 11 1997) (requiring infringing activity to be "in commerce"); see
also supra notes 49-50 (quoting the relevant statutory language).
92. See International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nurs-
ing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that "[t]rademark ... laws exist largely to
protect the public from confusion").
93. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1117 (1994) (outlining remedies for trademark infringe-
ment).
94. See id.
95. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing the effects of public and media use on trade-
marks).
96. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 31:147, at 31-213 to 31-215 (discussing limita-
tion on trademark owners' ability to prevent non-commercial use of their marks when that
use is labeled pure speech as opposed to commercial speech). This powerlessness is due to
the free speech protection afforded by the First Amendment. See generally Yankee Publ'g
Inc. v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that
the First Amendment is implicated when one uses another's mark as part of a communica-
tive message and not as a source identifier). A court will construe the Lanham Act nar-
rowly when the unauthorized use of the trademark is for the purpose of a communicative
message, rather than as an indication of its source. See id. at 276. Aside from being pro-
tected by the First Amendment, non-commercial use of another's trademark usually is not
within the scope of the Lanham Act. See generally Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F.
Supp. 931, 934-35 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding use of "STAR WARS" mark in conjunction
with messages about SDI to be non-actionable under the Lanham Act). But cf. MGM-
Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(granting a preliminary injunction, despite a First Amendment defense, against a gay ac-
tivist organization that barred them from using the mark "Pink Panther Patrol" due to a
likelihood of confusion). If the law did not protect communicative messages, the result
would be the recognition of an absolute property right in the trademark, thereby effec-
tively causing the removal of a word from our language. See New Kids On The Block v.
News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that "[a]
trademark is a limited property right in a... word, phrase or symbol").
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B. Judicial Recognition of Trademark Rights Through Media and Public
Use
Media and public use of the term "March Madness" in favor of the
NCAA played a major role in the outcome of Illinois High School
Ass'n.97 Looking at a number of trademark cases involving public and
media use outside of the generic terms context, support can be gleaned
for the proposition that public and media use can create trademark rights
as it did in Illinois High School Ass'n. 98
At common law, merchants established trademark rights through the
use of symbols to identify their goods or services, thereby distinguishing
their goods or services from those of other merchants.99 Many courts be-
gan to recognize that an entity could acquire trademark rights through
the public's identification of terms with a company or its products, even
though the entity had never actually used that trademark.1°° This phe-
nomenon arose from the judiciary's realization that many Americans
were prone to abbreviate common trademarks and, to some extent, to
97. See infra Part IV (discussing the decision in detail).
98. See Johnny Blastoff Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1385, 1396-97 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (finding trademark rights in "St. Louis Rams"
through public association); infra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2.
99. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 16:1, at 16-3 (discussing common law trade-
mark ownership). At common law, courts held that trademark rights began to accrue
when the mark was "affixe[d]" to the seller's goods. See Rolley, Inc. v. Younghusband,
204 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1953) (holding that ownership depends on time of fixation);
Waldes v. International Mfgs. Agency, Inc., 237 F. 502, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (stating that
registration alone confers no trademark rights). The mark was affixed "when [the] prod-
uct bearing the symbol first confronted [buyers] in the marketplace." 2 MCCARTHY, su-
pra note 1, § 16:23, at 16-31. This old rule has been liberalized and now pre-sales solicita-
tion and advertising, as long as it creates an association between the symbol and the
producer's goods, can establish trademark significance in a term. See id. § 16:24, at 16-32.
Mere advertising, however, does not constitute statutory trademark use. See id. § 16:28, at
16-36.
100. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that public use of a trade name could create rights
in the name); Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 408 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (finding
"Coke" to be a protected nickname because of public use); Norac Co. v. Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 315 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (stating that public use of a
term can create rights in the company that produces the named product). For public use
to be analogous to trademark use, such use must be an open or public use di-
rected to the segment of industry or purchasing public for whom the party's
goods or services are intended and be in a manner calculated to attract the atten-
tion of the viewer and thereby create an association of said term with such goods
or services.
American Stock Exch., Inc. v. American Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356, 364
(T.T.A.B. 1980).
[48:605
1999] The Impact of Public and Media Use on Trademark Rights 621
use nicknames when referring to certain goods or services." Courts held
that such public use conferred protectable rights in the abbreviation or
nickname that the public had created."" As a result, competitors were
prevented from capitalizing on the trademark owner's goodwill and were
forbidden from causing confusion by using marks that the public had
come to associate with the trademark owners.' 3 Abbreviations and
nicknames for common trademarks thus gained trademark protection, on
par with actual trademarks, solely through public association.'14 They
have been protected since that time through unfair competition law. 05 A
federal registration of the mark is not required for this type of cause of
action. 1°6
101. See, e.g. Coca-Cola Co., 44 F. Supp. at 408 (stating that "there is a marked ten-
dency among American youth... [to] abbreviate"); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §
7:18, at 17-24.10 to 17-24.11 (listing protected abbreviations and nicknames for trade-
marks). For example, before "Coke" became a registered trademark of the Coca-Cola
Company, members of the purchasing public began to abbreviate the company's trade-
mark from "Coca-Cola" to "Coke" when asking for the soft drink. See Coca-Cola Co. v.
Christopher, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353, 354 (E.D. Mich. 1941); see also Coca-Cola Co. v. Los
Angeles Brewing Co., 44 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 190, 192 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (finding "Coke" to be
synonymous with the term "Coca-Cola").
102. See National Cable Television Ass'n, 937 F.2d at 1577-78; Coca-Cola Co., 44 F.
Supp. at 408; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:18, at 7-24.10 to 7-24.11. One court went so
far as to hold that use by the public can "inure[] to the claimant's benefit" resulting in the
conclusion that such public use is trademark use by the claimant. National Cable Televi-
sion Ass'n, 937 F.2d at 1577-78.
103. See Johnny Blastoff Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1396-97 (holding that failing to recog-
nize superior rights in the mark "St. Louis Rams" in favor of the defendant football team
through public association would lead to consumer confusion); infra Parts II.B.1. and
II.B.2. The fact that the public has come to refer to a seller's goods by a nickname or ab-
breviation must be supported by actual evidence; thus, mere assertions are insufficient.
See Londontown Mfg. Co. v. Cable Raincoat Co., 371 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding evidence insufficient to support assertion that public understood the term "The
Fog" to mean London Fog's raincoats); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Katrak Vehicle Co., 172
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 410 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (finding evidence insufficient to support the
assertion that the public and the trade members referred to the Caterpillar Tractor Com-
pany as "CAT").
104. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:18, at 7-24.10 to 7-24.11, 7-25 to 7-27 (citing
cases illustrating that public usage of abbreviations and nicknames of well-known trade-
marks may confer protectable trademark rights); infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2 (discussing
trademark protection afforded abbreviations and nicknames for trademarks).
105. See, e.g., Johnny Blastoff Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1396-97; Coca-Cola Co., 44 F.
Supp. at 410 (using unfair competition law to enjoin the user of the mark "Koke-Up");
Arthur Guinness, Son & Co. v. Oscar Von Bernuth, 14 F. Supp. 210, 211-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1923).
106. See 1 CHARLEs E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG, III, FEDERAL UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT § 43(A), § 3.01, at 3-22 n.60 (West Group 1998) (1989) (cit-
ing cases holding same). Rights recognized under section 43(a) and those recognized un-
der a federal trademark registration differ in one significant manner. Actual use of the
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1. The Unfair Competition Cases
The courts' recognition of trademark rights in abbreviated forms
of well-known trademarks began as early as 1942.07 For example, in
Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch,1°8 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the defendant unfairly competed with Coca-Cola
in adopting the mark "Koke-Up" on cola beverages. °9 Coca-Cola had
not used "Coke" or "Koke" on its goods and, therefore, the court said
that it could not recover on a common law trademark infringement the-
ory."1 The court, however, turned to the broader field of unfair competi-
tion to find support for Coca-Cola's position."' It found that the abbre-
viation of the "Coca-Cola" trademark to "Koke," as used by the public
to designate Coca-Cola's product, was "equally as much to be protected
as the trademark itself."1
2
Courts also recognize trademark rights in nicknames or other terms
that the public associates with a particular company's goods or services. "3
For example, in Arthur Guinness, Son & Co. v. Oscar Von Bernuth,"4 a
mark in commerce is required for a trademark registration. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note
1, § 19:10, at 19-20 to 19-21 (discussing the eligibility requirements for trademarks to be
entitled to federal registration). The Lanham Act defines "use in commerce" as:
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be
deemed to be in use in commerce-(1) on goods when-(A) it is placed in any
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or
on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their
sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and (2) on services
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services
are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State
or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the serv-
ices is engaged in commerce in connection with
the services.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
107. See Coca-Cola Co., 44 F. Supp. at 410.
108. 44 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
109. See id. at 410.
110. See id. at 407. The court stated that "a strict construction of the authorities on
common law trade infringement would seem to hold that there could be no infringement."
Id.
111. Seeid. at 410.
112. Id. The court found that the evidence established that the defendant chose the
trademark "'Koke-Up' solely for the [deliberate] purpose of taking advantage of the good
will and reputation of ['Coca-Cola'] ... to his [sole] benefit [and] to the deception of the
public." Id.
113. See Arthur Guinness, Son & Co. v. Oscar Von Bernuth, 14 F. Supp. 210, 211-12
(S.D.N.Y. 1923).
114. 14 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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United States federal district court granted an injunction against the de-
fendant Bernuth's use of the mark "Dublin Stout XXX." '' The evidence
showed that consumers associated "Dublin Stout" with Guinness, even
116though Guinness never actually used the mark on its beer. The court
reasoned that the fact that the term "Dublin Stout" was first used by the
public, and not created by Guinness, was unimportant.1 7 The court de-
termined that the public had, for a considerable period of time, equated
Guinness's beer with that name and, as a result, the use of that mark by
another would mislead the public.'18 The court, therefore, granted Guin-
ness's request for an injunction. 9
2. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Cases
The TTAB also has recognized that use by the media and public can
create trademark rights.12 0 For example, in Pieper v. Playboy Enterprises,In121
Inc. , the TTAB refused to cancel Playboy's registration of the mark
"Bunny Club," even though Pieper had used the same mark for restau-
rant services prior to Playboy's use.22 The TFAB found that long prior
to Pieper's use of the mark, Playboy used a bunny symbol in connection
with many of its goods and services.' In addition, Playboy referred to
the cocktail waitresses employed at its Playboy clubs as "bunnies."' 24
Due to the direct association between Playboy's bunny motif and the
term "Bunny Club," the TTAB concluded that consumers would associ-
ate the mark "Bunny Club" with Playboy's clubs, not with Pieper's res-
taurant services. Further, because the media and the public had used
115. See id. at 211-12.




119. See id. at 212.
120. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the TTAB's protection for abbreviations and
nicknames for trademarks). The TTAB has stated
[i]t has been held that where the public has come to associate a term with a par-
ticular company and/or its goods or services as a result, for example, of use of the
term in the trade and by the news media, that company has a protectable prop-
erty right in the term even if the company itself has made no use of the term.
American Stock Exch., Inc. v. American Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356, 364
(T.T.A.B. 1980).
121. 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 318 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
122. See id. at 320.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. The TrAB stated that there was a direct association between the bunny
symbol and bunny costumes, with the term "Bunny Club," when it was used to designate a
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the term "Bunny Club" to refer to Playboy's services long before the pe-
titioner began using the term for restaurant services, the TTAB decided
that the goodwill associated with the mark rested with Playboy.
116
Similarly, years later in National Cable Television Ass'n v. AmericanT 121
Cinema Editors, Inc. , the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit upheld the TTAB's cancellation of the trademark "ACE" as
used by the National Cable Television Association (NCTA) for its televi-
sion awards ceremony.18 The NCTA argued that American Cinema Edi-
tors, Inc. did not have standing to seek trademark cancellation because
American Cinema had not used "ACE" as its trade name or as its service
mark for its awards ceremony.9 Therefore, NCTA argued that its
trademark registration for "ACE" could not damage American Cin-
ema." The court disagreed, holding that American Cinema's use of
"ACE" in its publications, articles, and correspondence was sufficient as
a trade name and as a service mark. 3' Furthermore, evidence consisting
of newspaper articles and third party correspondence showed that
American Cinema had been known publicly as "ACE., 13 2 The court rea-
soned that precedent had established that public use could give rise to
protectable rights, even in the absence of actual use by the party seeking
protection (e.g., American Cinema).' The court elaborated further,
stating that such use by the public inured to the party seeking protec-
114tion's benefit; thus, it was as if the party had Used the mark. The court
held that NCTA acted at its own peril when it adopted "ACE" as a
trademark, regardless of the amount of money it spent to popularize its
own award show and regardless of the fact that its award show had be-
come better known than American Cinema's name."'
night club. See id.
126. See id.; cf. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 857, 860, 864 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (sustaining an opposition against the registration of
the mark "Harley-Hog" for pork products because the good will associated with the term
"Hog" belonged to the manufacturer of Harley-Davidson motorcycles, despite the fact
that the manufacturer had not made use of the mark).
127. 937 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
128. See id. at 1582.
129. See id. at 1578 n.5.
130. See id. at 1579.
131. See id. at 1577-78.
132. See id. at 1577.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1577-78. The court stated that "[s]uch public use by others inures to the
claimant's benefit and, where this occurs, public use can reasonably be deemed use 'by'
that party in the sense of a use on its behalf." Id.
135. See id. at 1582. The court held that "a late-comer acts at its peril in [adopting]
and investing in a [trade]mark [that infringes] on the rights of another." Id.
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The TIAB has considered public use and association in deciding who
used the mark first for priority purposes.16 In Norac Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.,137 the TTAB refused to cancel Occidental's trademark
"OXY," despite the fact that Norac had used the mark "OXY" in con-
nection with fertilizer prior to Occidental's first use."' The TIAB rea-
soned that, because the public associated the use of the term "OXY"
with Occidental's oil and gas trade prior to Norac's use of the term in
connection with its fertilizer business, Occidental was able to tack on the
time of this prior use and public association for priority purposes when it
expanded its business to fertilizer.!
Other TTAB decisions place similar significance on the public's use
and association of product nicknames. 40 For example, in Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Thermo-Chem Corp. , the TTAB sus-
tained Volkswagen's opposition to Thermo-Chem's attempt to register
"BUG COOLER" as a trademark for an engine oil cooling system.
1 42
The TTAB held that Volkswagen had acquired a right in the term
"BUG" in the automotive field because of the general public's and
Volkswagen dealers' long use of the term "BUG" to describe Volks-
wagen's small automobile.'43
Despite these decisions, not all claims heard by the TTAB regarding
rights acquired through public use and association have been success-
ful.1 44 For example, in Big Blue Products Inc. v. International Business
Machines Corp.,45 the TTAB denied IBM's motion for summary judg-
ment on the issue of prior rights to the term "Big Blue., 146 IBM offered
evidence showing that the public referred to IBM as "Big Blue" long be-
136. See Norac Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 317
(T.T.A.B. 1977).
137. 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
138. See id. at 317.
139. See id. at 315-17.
140. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Thermo-Chem Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 561,562 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
141. 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
142. See id. at 561-62.
143. See id. at 562. The TTAB remarked that a survey of people had established that
the association between the term "BUG" and Volkswagen was very strong. See id. For
instance, the term "BUG" was used to indicate Volkswagen's cars in the Disney movie,
"Love Bug," as well as in numerous magazines. See id.
144. See Big Blue Prods. Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072
(T.T.A.B. 1991).
145. 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1991).
146. See id. at 1073-74.
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fore the opposer began using the term on typewriter ribbons.14' Despite
this, the TTAB concluded that IBM was not entitled to summary judg-
ment, as it had failed to establish that the public viewed "Big Blue" as a
trademark for any particular goods or services coming from IBM.' 8 The
TTAB viewed the public's use of the term "Big Blue" as a referrence to
IBM itself, not its products.'49
In the cases discussed above, the T'TAB's ultimate goal was to protect
• 150
consumers from confusion as to source or sponsorship. The courts pro-
tected the nicknames or abbreviations used by the public even though
the trademark owner actually never had used them on goods or serv-
ices. " The use of the term by the public and media inured to the benefit
of the trademark owner."2 Such cases, however, are rare.153
III. OTHER IMPORTANT TRADEMARK CONCEPTS: CONFUSION,
PRIORITY OF USE, AND "REVERSE CONFUSION"
A. Confusion
In the typical trademark infringement suit, the traditional concepts of
likelihood of confusion, priority of use, and in certain cases reverse con-
fusion, will be applied." A discussion of these more typical concepts is
necessary for an understanding of Illinois High School Ass'n. The test
for infringement under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
whether there is likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's and de-
fendant's marks.' Confusion between two marks may cause injury to
the trademark owner by diverting sales, jeopardizing goodwill, or by lim-
iting expansion. Accordingly, courts apply a likelihood of confusion
analysis in cases where two competing entities use the same mark on
147. See id. (IBM submitted over 500 articles to show that "Big Blue" was associated
with IBM).
148. See id. at 1074.
149. See id.
150. See supra Part II.B (discussing the rationale involved in the public association
cases).
151. See supra Part II.B.1 and II.B.2.
152. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
153. See Big Blue, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1074 (stating that the TTAB has held that public
association can create trademark rights in rare cases).
154. See infra Part III (discussing confusion, priority of use, and reverse confusion).
155. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994); see also supra notes 49-50 (quoting the lan-
guage of the sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
156. See Richard L. Kirkpatrick, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW §
1.2, at 1-6 (Practicing Law Institute 1995).
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competing goods."' Courts take numerous factors into consideration in
determining whether two marks can exist without confusing customers,
including but not limited to the (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity
of the goods; (3) area and manner of concurrent use; (4) degree of care
exercised by the consumers; (5) strength of the plaintiff's mark; (6) evi-
dence of actual confusion; and (7) intent of the defendant to pass off its
goods as those of the plaintiff.' 8 The likelihood of confusion is a ques-
tion of fact and the weight accorded to each element of the analysis de-
pends on the facts of each individual case.5 9
B. Priority of Use
In a trademark infringement suit, the entity that used the mark first is
called the "senior user" and any entity that begins use of the same mark
at a subsequent time is called the "junior user."'' In battles between
marks of equal strength, the deciding factor typically will be who used
the mark first in the geographic region in question.' There is no con-
sumer recognition or goodwill associated with mere adoption of a word
as a trademark. 6 2 The early rationale for priority of use revolved around
157. See International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nurs-
ing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996); WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d
42, 44 (1st Cir. 1991); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1, at 23-7 to 23-8. Likelihood of
confusion analysis is the keystone of common law and statutory trademark infringement.
See id. § 23:1, at 23-8.
158. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:19, at 23-47 to 23-49. Each circuit has its
own set of factors to be used in determining the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., AMF,
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing the factors used in the
Ninth Circuit). These factors apply equally to competitive and non-competitive goods.
See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:19, at 23-48.
159. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361-62 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(citing a list of factors for determining likelihood of confusion).
160. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 16:4, at 16-5.
161. See, e.g. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916) (priority of
appropriation settles the question when both parties compete under the same mark in the
same market); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 16:4, at 16-5 (citing cases holding
priority of use to be the determining factor). There are many cases on this subject. See,
e.g. United States v. Emil Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding that trademark rights
are "founded on priority of appropriation"); Western Stove Co. v. Geo. D. Roper Corp.,
82 F. Supp. 206, 213 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (stating that a trademark owner will prevail against
subsequent owners).
162. See 1 JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE § 3.03(2)(d), at 3-70 to 3-72 (1998) (explaining that trademark rights hinge
on the actual use of a mark). Good will is defined as "a business value that reflects the
basic human propensity to continue doing business with a seller who has offered goods
and services that the customer likes and has found adequate to fulfill his needs." 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:17, at 2-37.
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the idea that others were attempting to "pass off"'163 their goods as those
of the trademark owner.164
In the aforementioned cases, courts at times recognized publicly cre-
ated associations in favor of one party, but only when such public asso-
ciations developed prior to the use of that same term by the other
party.6 6 The rationale involved in upholding trademark rights created by
public association is that the infringer should not be able to take advan-
tage of the goodwill created by that public association. 166 Taking advan-




Traditional trademark infringement cases often involve "forward con-
fusion"-where consumers mistakenly believe that the goods of "junior"
users emanate from the "senior" user's source.168 In this scenario, a con-
sumer who seeks to purchase the senior user's goods, might mistakenly
purchase the junior user's instead. 69 In a "reverse confusion" case, how-
ever, consumers mistakenly believe that the senior user's goods come
from the junior user. 17 This usually occurs after a junior user has con-
ducted a widespread advertising and promotion campaign whereby it
overpowered the senior user's reputation in the market."7 The result is
that consumers may think that the senior user is the infringer and is tak-
172ing advantage of the reputation of the junior user. Reverse confusion
163. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 25:1, at 25-4. The term "passing off" has been used
by courts to describe situations where a seller substitutes one brand for another unbe-
knownst to the buyer or to situations when a defendant intends to defraud and confuse
buyers. See id.; Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 908
(1964) [hereinafter Competitive Torts] (describing the different meanings of "passing off").
In an 1842 British case, Lord Langdale wrote of "passing off": "'[a] man is not to sell his
own goods under the pretense that they are the goods of another man."' 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 25:1, at 25-4 (quoting Percy v. Trueffit, 6 Beav. 66 (Eng. 1842)).
164. See Competitive Torts, supra note 163, at 908 (describing different meanings of
"passing off").
165. See supra Part II.B.1-2 (discussing trademark protection afforded abbreviations
and nicknames for trademarks).
166. See Pieper v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 318, 320 (T.T.A.B. 1973)
(explaining that Pieper's use of "BUNNY CLUB" was likely to deceive the public).
167. See id. (stating that the use of the mark by Pieper could cause consumers to be-
lieve that it was associated with Playboy).




172. See id. at 23-26.
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has been held to be actionable under the Lanham Act.173
Generally, a finding of reverse confusion will entail culpable conduct
174
on part of the junior user. What happens, however, when a non-
culpable third party such as the media, not the junior user, causes the re-
verse confusion? Until 1996, this issue had not been addressed fully.
75
In Illinois High School Ass'n, the Seventh Circuit addressed this question
and implicitly held that culpable conduct on the part of the junior user is
required before that junior user can be held liable76 It now appears that
when a non-culpable media causes reverse confusion, and the junior user
does not engage in any culpable conduct, there is no infringer to sue and
trademark owners will be powerless to stop this reverse confusion from
happening.
77
IV. ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL ASS'N V. GTE VANTAGE INC.:
TRADEMARK RIGHTS CREATED IN A JUNIOR USER THROUGH PUBLIC
ASSOCIATION
The sport of basketball is extremely popular today, and thus re-
ceives a lot of media attention. This attention is especially intense each
March when the NCAA holds its national championship collegiate bas-
173. See, e.g. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oat6 Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding "reverse confusion" to be actionable because it invoked the same poli-
cies as a typical infringement suit: preventing customer confusion), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
1042 (1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1994).
174. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding culpable conduct necessary for finding of "reverse confusion"), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1083 (1997); Quaker Oats, 978 F.2d at 961. In Quaker Oats, a small Vermont-based
company, the plaintiff, had used the mark "Thirst-Aid" for about sixty years in connection
with soda fountain syrups and maltless soft drinks. See id. at 949-50. Thereafter, the de-
fendant, Quaker Oats, launched a major advertising campaign for its Gatorade brand iso-
tonic beverage using the slogan "Gatorade is Thirst Aid." See id. at 950-51. The plaintiff
filed suit on a "reverse confusion" theory. See id. at 951, 957. The Seventh Circuit found
Quaker Oats liable for infringement based on this theory. See id. at 957-61.
175. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245-46 (stating that the case was one of
first impression).
176. See id. at 246-47 (holding that neither IHSA nor the NCAA were culpable). The
distinction between Illinois High School Ass'n and the average reverse confusion case is
that the NCAA, the source of the rights of GTE Vantage, was not using the mark and did
not itself do anything outside of acquiescence to allow "March Madness" to become pri-
marily associated with its tournament. See id. (stating that if the NCAA was responsible
for eliminating the exclusive association of "March Madness" with IHSA, IHSA may have
had a remedy).
177. See id. (no cause of action because the NCAA was not culpable); see also infra
notes 205-07 and accompanying text (discussing reverse confusion in Illinois High School
Ass'n). There are situations where the media could be found culpable, such as if CBS used
"March Madness" to promote its broadcasts of the NCAA tournament. See Illinois High
Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246.
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ketball tournament. Many people know the annual NCAA basketball
tournament by the term "March Madness," but few realize that the term
did not originate with the NCAA.
In the 1940s, IHSA coined the phrase "March Madness" to denote its
annual state high school basketball tournament.' 7 Since then, the IHSA
tournament has become one of the premier high school tournaments in
the country, and sometimes is televised nationally. IHSA sells goods
bearing the mark "March Madness" at its tournament site and else-
where."' IHSA also has authorized the use of the name to other high
school associations in different parts of the country,"' and even has li-
censed the use of the name to Wilson Sporting Goods, Pepsi, and the
Chicago Tribune. 82
Sportscaster Brent Musburger covered the Illinois tournament as a lo-
cal high school reporter in the 1970s. 83 When he joined CBS as a sports
commentator, he began referring to the NCAA Men's Basketball tour-
nament as "March Madness."184 That term gained widespread recogni-
tion and, as a result, it is now common to refer to the NCAA tournament
as "March Madness.
1 85
IHSA knew that sports commentators were using "March Madness"
during national telecasts to refer to the NCAA tournament, but it took
178. See id. at 245. The origins of IHSA's use of "March Madness" can be traced to a
1942 poem by H.V. Porter. See Brief of Defendant/Appellee GTE Vantage Inc. at 2-3,
Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1981)
[hereinafter Brief of GTE Vantage]. Porter wrote of the IHSA tournament: "'A sharp-
shooting mite is king tonight / The Madness of March is running."' George Vecsey, The
March Madness Has Already Begun, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1995, § 8 (Sports), at 7 (em-
phasis added). This poem has been credited with sparking the phrase. See Brief of GTE
Vantage, supra, at 2. IHSA used the phrase in its tournament souvenir programs, as well
as in a 1977 book entitled MARCH MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF HIGH SCHOOL
BASKETBALL IN ILLINOIS. See id. at 3. In the early 1980s, IHSA also began using "March
Madness" on various souvenir merchandise sold at the tournament sites and at retail
stores in Illinois. See id. at 7-8.
179. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245.
180. See id.; see also infra note 182 (discussing the merchandising of the mark "March
Madness").
181. See Brief of Illinois High School Association, supra note 39, at 4.
182. See id. at 4-5. IHSA had licensed the use of "March Madness" to Pepsi for use on
in-store displays and on Pepsi cans, to Wilson Sporting Goods for use on basketballs, and
to the Chicago Tribune for use on its Web-site. See id.
183. See Vecsey, supra note 178, at 7.
184. See id. Musberger said in an interview that he was certain that he got the phrase
"March Madness" from his days of covering the IHSA tournament. See id.
185. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245. See generally Brief of GTE Vantage,
supra note 178, at 4-7 (providing illustrative examples of media uses of "March Madness"
in reference to the NCAA basketball tournament).
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no action against either the media or the NCAA to enforce its prior
trademark rights to the expression.186 When it finally did act, IHSA's
choice of action itself was limited. Until it began licensing "March Mad-
ness" in 1993, the NCAA neither used the mark on goods nor used it in
advertising connected with the collegiate tournament8 The sports
commentators had been using "March Madness" to describe the NCAA
tournament.'m Also, the general public had begun to use the term
"March Madness" to refer to the NCAA tournament. 89 As a result,
IHSA was essentially powerless to stop the media and public usage of the
phrase due to the First Amendment protections afforded to members of
the press and the public9
IHSA finally acted after the NCAA licensed the use of "March Mad-
ness" to the video game manufacturer, GTE Vantage, for its use in con-
nection with a basketball CD-ROM game.'91 Motivated by the thought
of losing valuable royalties, IHSA brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois seeking to enjoin GTE
Vantage from using its mark.' 92 The district court denied the injunction,
holding first that IHSA's rights were limited to its tournament and sec-
ond, that its attempts to expand had come after widespread media use in
favor of the NCAA, which, in turn, gave the NCAA common law trade-
mark rights with respect to its own tournament.9 The district court also
held that IHSA had not established a likelihood of confusion as a result
186. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245-46. At the district court level, IHSA
had stated that it was not concerned about non-commercial uses of the mark by the
NCAA or anyone else. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., No. 96-1119, at
49-50 (C.D. Ill. March 20, 1996) (hearing on motion for preliminary injunction).
187. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n. 99 F.3d at 245 (stating that the NCAA began licens-
ing "March Madness" in 1993 or 1994); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 27, at 6 (stating that IHSA had not used the "March Madness" mark).
188. See generally Brief of Illinois High School Association, supra note 39, at 18 (citing
examples of use of "March Madness" in print media). The Seventh Circuit did acknowl-
edge, however, that IHSA may have had a cause of action against CBS had the network
used "March Madness" to promote its broadcasts of the NCAA tournament. See Illinois
High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. The court, however, refused to speculate on the merits of
such a suit. See id.
189. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245.
190. See id. at 246.
191. See Brief of GTE Vantage, supra note 178, at 13. GTE Vantage was using
"March Madness" on its web page, in magazine advertisements, and on one of the com-
puter screens appearing in the game. See id.
192. See id. IHSA in fact demanded that GTE Vantage cease using "March Madness"
or negotiate a license to use the term with IHSA. See id.
193. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., No. 96-1119, at 100, 104 (C.D.
Ill. Mar. 20, 1996).
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of GTE Vantage's licensed use.' 94 The district court made this determi-
nation despite the fact that the marks were identical and both were used
in connection with basketball.19 It found the competing marks to be dis-
similar, in that one clearly pointed to products related to high school
basketball and the other pointed to products related to college basket-
ball. 196 The area and manner of concurrent use also was different-
IHSA's use was primarily regional, while the NCAA's use was national
in scope.' 97 Furthermore, the district court held that consumers were not
likely to purchase a video game dealing with high school basketball when
they were looking specifically for one dealing with college basketball.99
Moreover, the district court believed that the widespread media use had
severely weakened IHSA's mark. 99 As such, the court deemed the li-
cense given by the NCAA to GTE Vantage, for the use of "March Mad-
ness" in connection with a CD-ROM game based on the NCAA basket-
ball tournament, to be non-actionable by IHSA.2°°
IHSA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, arguing that media use could not divest a trademark owner of its
prior rights by transferring those rights to another who technically had
not used the trademark. °' Without directly addressing this argument, the
Seventh Circuit found that "March Madness" had, in the minds of the
public, come to mean the NCAA tournament as well as the IHSA tour-
194. See id. at 103-04; see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 2.
195. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, No. 96-1119, at 100-01 (hearing on motion for pre-
liminary injunction).
196. See id. at 101. The modern test for the similarity of goods is the "related goods"
test. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:6, at 24-13 to 24-14. A closely related product
is one "which would reasonably be thought by the buying public to come from the same
source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark
owner." Id. at 24-12 to 24-13; see also Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978
F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1992) (relying on the "related goods" test to determine the likeli-
hood of confusion), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042 (1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 34 F.3d
1340 (7th Cir. 1994).
197. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, No. 96-1119, at 102 (hearing on motion for prelimi-
nary injunction). Trademark rights often depend on the geographic scope of use, because
there is no protection where an entity has not used its trademark. See United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (holding that trademark rights extend only
as far as where the mark has been used).
198. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, No. 96-1119, at 102 (hearing on motion for prelimi-
nary injunction).
199. See id. at 100, 103.
200. See id. at 104.
201. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997); Brief of Illinois High School Association, supra
note 39, at 12-20. Actual trademark use is use of a mark on or in connection with goods or
services in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining use in commerce).
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nament 2  For that reason, the Seventh Circuit refused to enjoin GTE
Vantage.
In making this determination, the Seventh Circuit created a new classi-
fication of trademark, a "dual-use" mark, which allowed both the NCAA
and IHSA to use "March Madness" in connection with their respective
basketball tournaments. 201 IHSA argued that a "dual-use" of the term
"March Madness" would cause reverse confusion because consumers
would think that the NCAA sponsored both IHSA's tournament and the
IHSA-licensed merchandise affixed with the trademark "March Mad-
ness. '20 5 In essence, IHSA asserted that, to consumers, IHSA would ap-
206pear to be the trademark infringer.
The Seventh Circuit rejected IHSA's reverse confusion argument.
20 7
The court held that a court need not resolve the issue of likelihood of
confusion unless "the plaintiff has a trademark that the law will pro-
tect. ' '2m The court reasoned that because the public had come to associ-
ate the term "March Madness" with the NCAA tournament, and not
only the IHSA tournament, IHSA did not have any rights to the term
that would bar GTE Vantage's licensed use.209
IHSA also argued "that it [was] unfair [for] its [trademark] rights [to]
depend on the whims of the media," because neither IHSA nor a court
could have stopped the media from using the term "March Madness"
210due to First Amendment concerns. In response to this argument, the
202. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-47.
203. See id. at 248.
204. See id. at 247; Fletcher & Kera, supra note 26, at 797 (stating that "dual-use"
terms are "another category of trademark").
205. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. The court did not consider the issue
of reverse confusion because the issue of confusion arises only when "the plaintiff has a
trademark that the law will protect." Id. The Seventh Circuit held that IHSA did not
have such a trademark. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 246-47. The court stated that had the NCAA itself been responsible for
the weakening of the association of "March Madness" with IHSA, IHSA might have a
remedy on a theory of reverse confusion. See id. The court stated further, however, that it
probably would not be an injunctive remedy because that would promote even more con-
fusion among consumers. See id. Therefore, if an injunction was not appropriate, the
court probably would award damages. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats
Co., 978 F.2d 947, 961-63 (7th Cir. 1992) (awarding large damages including profits, attor-
ney's fees, and prejudgment interest in a reverse confusion case), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
1042 (1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1994).
208. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. The court determined that IHSA's
mark was not protectable with respect to the NCAA basketball tournament. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
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court admonished IHSA for its belated efforts to protect its mark, and
emphasized that trademark owners must take steps to protect the
strength of their trademarks by endeavoring to convince the media and
others to avoid using their marks in reference to anything other than the
trademarked goods. 21' The court found that "IHSA was not assiduous"
enough in protecting its mark because IHSA had allowed the media to
use the term for a long time without ever taking action to halt that use.212
The Seventh Circuit also explained that, because a trademark is primar-
ily a designation of its source, the trademark "dies" when the designation
of its source ceases to exist, as long as the potential defendant is not re-
sponsible for the trademark's inability to denote its source.213
Here, because neither the NCAA nor GTE Vantage were responsible
for the weakening of IHSA's mark, the court refused to enjoin GTE
214Vantage's licensed use of the mark. The Seventh Circuit analogized
IHSA's situation to previous cases discussing generic marks."5 The court
explained that principles of effective communication mandated a denial
of trademark rights in this case, as is the normal case with generic
216terms. IHSA argued, however, that "March Madness" was not a ge-
neric term for basketball tournaments in general nor "any other set of
events, that occur in March., 217 The court responded that, whether or
not "March Madness" was a generic term, legal principles prevented
trademark owners from removing words "from the public domain ...
that the public [uses] to [identify] someone else's good[s] or service[s]., 218
Such a situation would "leav[e] that someone and his customers speech-
less."219 Thus, for purposes of promoting effective communication, the
court would not allow IHSA to enjoin GTE Vantage from using the
term. 2° Further, the court held that the mark "March Madness" was a
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. The court said "[w]hat matters is that a trademark is not nearly so secure
an entitlement as a property right." Id. The court elaborated further in stating that even
an anti-dilution statute will not save a trademark that has lost its source denoting capabil-
ity. See id. at 247.
214. See id. at 246-47.
215. See id.; see also infra Part V.C.2 (discussing generic terms and the importance of
effective communication).




220. See id. The court stated that "for the sake of protecting effective communication
it should be resolved against trademark protection, thus assimilating dual-use or multiple-
use terms to generic terms." Id.
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"dual-use term," one that identified both the NCAA tournament and the
IHSA tournament, thus permitting IHSA and the NCAA to use the term
concurrently.22t
IHSA also argued that media use cannot divest a trademark owner of
its exclusive rights to a mark and urged the court to rely on Lucasfilm
222Ltd. v. High Frontier, a case where a federal district court refused to
enjoin various public interest groups from referring to the Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI) as "Star Wars., 223 The Lucasfilm court noted that
its holding would not hamper Lucasfilm's exclusive rights to use "Star
224Wars" in connection with sales of its goods and services. After ex-
plaining that Lucasfilm was not on point, the Seventh Circuit presented
an interesting hypothetical: "If someone bought rights to the SDI from
the U.S. government and sold the anti-missile program to another coun-
try under the name 'Star Wars,' nothing in the Lucasfilm opinion or...
trademark law would entitle Lucasfilm to enjoin that use of the name"
because "[t]he name would have become attached by the public to an-
other product as well as to the movies, just as happened here., 225 There-
fore, the Seventh Circuit refused to accept IHSA's interpretation of Lu-
casfilm; namely, that trademark owners have nothing to fear from
communicative uses of trademarks.226
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit declined to "opine on the scope of the
trademark rights that either IHSA or [the] NCAA" had beyond those
related to GTE Vantage's video game or the NCAA tournament.27 The
IHSA sought review by the United States Supreme Court. 8 In its peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari, IHSA argued that allowing public and media
use to usurp its prior exclusive rights in "March Madness" was not in ac-
cord with trademark precedent and would upset the balance between
trademark protection and the First Amendment.22 9 GTE Vantage coun-
tered that public and media use gave the NCAA trademark rights to use
221. See id.
222. 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
223. See id. at 935.
224. See id. (stating that "[t]he new meaning of the phrase in the political or scientific
context does not affect the distinct, and still strong secondary meaning of "STAR WARS"
in trade and entertainment").
225. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247-48.
226. See id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 12 (stating that
"[t]raditionally, trademark owners have had nothing to fear from communicative, non-
commercial uses of their marks").
227. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 248.
228. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 1.
229. See id. at 7-13.
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the term in connection with its tournament.20 The Supreme Court even-
tually denied IHSA's petition without comment.231
V. JUDICIAL CREATION OF "DUAL-USE" TERMS IN ILLINOIS HIGH
SCHOOL ASS'N V. GTE VANTAGE INC.
The Seventh Circuit held that, for the sake of effective communication,
the NCAA should be able to continue using the term "March Madness"
because a clear majority of the public identified that term with the
NCAA, not IHSA.232 Implicitly, the Seventh Circuit held that media and
public use had created common law trademark rights in the NCAA to
use the mark exclusively in connection with its tournament.2 ' That same
widespread media use essentially weakened IHSA's exclusive rights in
the mark "March Madness." 4  Consequently, both the NCAA and
IHSA were allowed to continue using the term "March Madness" for
their respective basketball tournaments.2 ' No case before had ever held
that public association could compromise exclusive trademark rights of a
prior user in favor of a third party who technically never had used the
trademark.2 " The court labeled this unique trademark a "dual-use"
term.237
In creating "dual-use" marks, the Seventh Circuit recognized what
could be seen as forced co-ownership of a trademark among unrelated
230. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 9.
231. See Illinois High School Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
232. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
233. See id. at 246-47. Although the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly state this, it was
the decision of the district court. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., No.
96-1119, at 100 (C.D. I11. March 20, 1996) (hearing on motion for preliminary injunction)
(denying injunction based upon NCAA's rights obtained through public and media use).
234. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; see also Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v.
GTE Vantage Inc., No. 96-1119, at 103 (C.D. 111. March 20, 1996) (hearing on motion for
preliminary injunction) (discussing how the media's extensive use weakened IHSA's ex-
clusive rights in the mark).
235. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247-48.
236. See id. at 247; see' also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 8. The
court said that the case raised a "novel issue of trademark law." See Illinois High Sch.
Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 245. Prior cases had recognized that public association could vest one
with trademark rights. See supra Part II.B.1-2 (discussing trademark protection afforded
abbreviations and nicknames for trademarks). Those cases, however, involved a plaintiff
whose public association was created before the defendant had begun using the mark. See
supra Part II.B.1-2.
237. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247. A few cases recognized terms with a
dual usage in the generic terms context. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
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entities."8 What the court created, or perhaps simply endorsed, was a
type of trademark that multiple parties could use.239 Now, when one
segment of consumers comes to associate a mark with one source and
another segment of consumers eventually comes to associate the mark
with an entirely different source, a "dual-use" mark may exist.240 How
often "dual-use" terms will arise in future trademark cases remains un-
certain, however, because "dual-use" rights appear to be derived only
241from public or media use.
A. The Validity of "Dual- Use" Terms
1. The NCAA Had Acquired Common Law Trademark Rights in
"March Madness" Through Public and Media Use
In some respects, the Seventh Circuit's creation of "dual-use" rights in
favor of IHSA and the NCAA seems contrary to basic principles of
trademark law.242 Trademark rights traditionally arise out of actual use in
238. See generally Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 27, at 4. The joint ownership of trademarks has been approved judicially;
in addition the United States Patent and Trademark Office will accept an application by
joint applicants for a trademark in "appropriate circumstances." See In re Diamond Wal-
nut Growers, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 507, 509-16 (T.T.A.B. 1979); Ex parte Edward
Taylor, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 293 (Comm'r Pats. 1933); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§
16:40-16:45, at 16-51 to 16-62 (discussing problems with joint ownership of trademarks).
However, courts and commentators often look on joint ownership of trademarks with dis-
favor. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 16:40-16:45, at 16-51 to 16-62; see also J. Tho-
mas McCarthy, Joint Ownership of a Trademark, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1983) (arguing
that there are problems with multiple owners of a single mark).
239. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 27, at 4. In its reply brief to IHSA's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, GTE Vantage
argued that "the Seventh Circuit did not 'create a new 'dual-use' trademark,"' and that the
concept of "dual-use" of trademarks was "hardly novel." Respondent's Brief, supra note
27, at 15.
240. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
241. See generally id. at 246. The issue presented in Illinois High School Ass'n arose
recently in Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D.
Mo. 1997), when NBA Properties sought summary judgment against a prior user of the
mark based on NBA Properties' superior right to the term "Dream Team" acquired
through public association. See id. at 1411. The court declined to apply Illinois High
School Ass'n under the facts of the case because the NBA and U.S.A. Olympic Basketball,
for the most part, were responsible for the public association. See id. at 1410. The court in
this case noted that this situation differed from Illinois High School Ass'n because in that
case, the media was solely responsible for creating the public association. See id. In April
1997, the parties reportedly settled and the NBA acquired rights to use "Dream Team" for
an undisclosed sum. See Fred Faust, Trademarks: Little Guy Fights Back, NAT'L L.J., May
19,1997, at B1-B2.
242. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 7-9.
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commerce, not by mere adoption.24 The mere invention or appropria-
tion of a word or phrase generally has not been enough to acquire
trademark rights.24 Yet even the law prior to Illinois High School Ass'n
recognized the acquisition of trademark rights through public and media
use alone.245 One court suggested that use by the public or media could
241inure to the benefit of the trademark owner. Other cases focused on
preventing entities from capitalizing on the association created by public
and media use that had already been established in favor of the party
claiming trademark rights.2 47  For example, in Coca-Cola v. Busch,2 4
where the defendant was using the mark "Koke-Up" and, therefore, ex-
ploiting the goodwill that Coca-Cola had acquired in the mark "Coke,"
the court enjoined Busch's use, despite the fact that only the public had
made use of the mark "Coke," not the Coca-Cola Company itself.
249
In Illinois High School Ass'n, the court enforced the NCAA's rights in
a similar fashion to the public association cases. ° The good will associ-
ated with the use of the mark "March Madness" in conjunction with
GTE Vantage's game, NCAA Championship Basketball, belonged al-
most entirely to the NCAA.2 ' As such, the court reasoned that it would
be unfair for IHSA to be allowed to control the use of the mark "March
212Madness" in connection with the NCAA tournament. What IHSA ap-
parently wanted, GTE Vantage argued, was to receive a windfall by con-
trolling the licensing of the mark "March Madness" in connection with
243. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating
that a trademark must be used "in connection with an existing business").
244. See id.
245. See supra Part II.B.1-2 (analyzing cases that recognized trademark rights through
public association).
246. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
247. See, e.g. Pieper v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 318, 320 (T.T.A.B.
1973) (finding Playboy's use of bunnies to preclude Pieper's use of the term "BUNNY
CLUB" because of the public's association of bunnies with Playboy); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (using the doctrine of unfair competition to
protect against the use of an abbreviated version of the mark).
248. 44 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
249. See id. at 410; see also Pieper, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 320.
250. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247-48 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997). The court reasoned that IHSA did not have a
strong enough trademark to assert against GTE Vantage's use in connection with the
NCAA tournament. See id.
251. See id. at 245-46.
252. See id at 247; see also Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 32 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that the Boston Athletic Association (BAA) was entitled to control the
merchandise surrounding the Boston Marathon because of the public's association of the
marathon with BAA).
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213the NCAA tournament . In cases dealing with merchandise relating to
an event however, precedent indicates that it is the event sponsor who
generally has the right to control the merchandise related to the event.2
4
Moreover, it was clearly the NCAA, through CBS, who made the term
"March Madness" famous. 55 Granting IHSA exclusive licensing rights to
the mark "March Madness" in connection with the NCAA tournament
would have allowed it "to reap where it had not sown. 25 6 Thus, the court
held that only the NCAA should be allowed to license the mark in con-
nection with the NCAA tournament.57
2. The Seventh Circuit Assimilated "Dual-Use" Terms to Generic
Terms
The Seventh Circuit based its decision in part on the need to protect
effective communication in the marketplace.258 It recognized the com-
mon tendency of people to call something by the name that most quickly
comes to mind.29 If the media referred to the NCAA tournament as
"March Madness," then that is the name the public would invoke when
referring to the NCAA tournament.2'6 The court analogized "dual-use"
terms to generic terms, because this pattern involving a "dual-use" term
was similar to that in cases involving generic terms.261 In both situations,
the court reasoned, the law should protect effective communication, even
262to the detriment of trademark rights.
The focus in generic cases is on what consumers understand the term
253. See Brief of GTE Vantage, supra note 178, at 34.
254. See Boston Athletic Ass'n, 867 F.2d at 32, 34 (holding that the sponsor of Boston
Marathon had right to control promotional merchandise); Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729
F. Supp. 438, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that defendant was not entitled to take a "free
ride" at the plaintiff's expense by selling unauthorized t-shirts at a Rolling Stones' con-
cert).
255. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 3.
256. International News Serv. v. The Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (holding
that it was an unfair practice for the defendant to sell news gathered by the plaintiff); see
also Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-47.
257. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 248.
258. See id. at 247. The court chose to protect communication rather than a trade-
mark, so as not to leave sports fans "speechless." See id.
259. See id. at 246; see also supra Part II.B.1-2 (citing cases recognizing trademark
rights in abbreviations of common trademarks and nicknames).
260. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. The court commented that the public
refers to the NCAA tournament as "March Madness" because most people gain their
college basketball knowledge from the media. See id.
261. See id. at 247.
262. See id.
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to mean. For example, if the public knows the pain reliever acetyl sali-
cylic acid only as "ASPIRIN," then the public will call it "ASPIRIN.
' 'z6
The public likely would continue to call all acetyl salicylic acid tablets
"ASPIRIN," regardless of the steps the trademark owner took to pre-
vent the generic use."' Similar issues were present with the term "March
Madness. ,
26 6
The public policy behind denying trademark protection to generic
terms is that one should not have a monopoly on a term that competitors
need to describe their products.261 With respect to "dual-use" terms,
similar public policy concerns are present; that is, it would be unfair for
IHSA to have a monopoly on the term "March Madness" when the ma-
jority of the public is using the term to refer to the NCAA tournament.266
Based on a generic terms analogy, the public should be allowed to con-
tinue to denote and understand the NCAA tournament as "March Mad-
ness," because, as in the generic terms cases, the public has used the term
"March Madness" to mean something other than IHSA trademarked
goods and services. 69 Therefore, the court's utilization of "March Mad-
ness" as a "dual-use" term is a natural expansion of the generic terms
doctrine, at least in terms of the rationale employed to justify them.70
3. "Dual-Use" Marks Can Designate More Than One Source
One of the most notable aspects emerging from the Illinois High
School Ass'n decision is the apparent conflict of the court's recognition
of "dual-use" terms with the important principle that a trademark acts as
an indicator of origin, serving to designate a single source of goods,
whether or not the source is anonymous.27 Following this new "dual-
263. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. If a court determines that the mark has
become the name of the product itself, the court must withdraw the mark from trademark
protection and allow it to move into the public domain in order to foster effective commu-
nication in the marketplace. See supra Part II.A (discussing generic terms).
264. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding
"ASPIRIN" to be a generic term).
265. See id.
266. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247 (assimilating "dual-use" terms to ge-
neric terms).
267. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:2, at 12-6 to 12-7 (quoting Judge Posner's
example of how trademark protection of the word "car" would impact negatively the
automobile sales industry).
268. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:2, at
12-6 to 12-7.
269. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
270. See id. (holding that "dual-use" terms should be assimilated with generic terms).
271. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 8; see also Illinois High Sch.
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use" rubric, a trademark may now identify more than one source for a
272particular type of good or service. IHSA argued that allowing two
separate parties to use the same mark on similar goods cuts against the
very foundation upon which trademark law rests-protecting consumers
from confusion.2 73 The Seventh Circuit's opinion however, did not ad-
274dress the issue of confusion arising from "dual-use" of the term.
275Moreover, the opinion was silent on the issue of concurrent use rights.
The Seventh Circuit's lack of guidance on these issues leaves questions
regarding consumer confusion and "dual-use" rights unanswered.
B. Quantifying the Rights of Each Dual-User: A Potential Trouble Spot
with "Dual- Use" Terms as Set Forth in Illinois High School Ass'n
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit declined to "opine on the scope of
the trademark rights that [both] IHSA [and] NCAA" possessed beyond
those in connection with the license to GTE Vantage and those associ-
ated with the NCAA tournament.276 Logically, it would seem that the
NCAA should have rights only to use "March Madness" in connection
with goods relating to its tournament, whereas the IHSA should have
rights appurtenant only to its tournament. The court stated however,
that "March Madness" had a strong association primarily with the
NCAA Tournament;277 therefore it is possible that the NCAA's rights in
Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
272. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247; see also Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 27, at 8.
273. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 27, at 8. When a consumer confronts goods bearing identical trademarks which, un-
beknownst to the consumer, emanate from two separate sources, the consumer cannot rely
on the trademark to identify the particular good that he or she has enjoyed in the past.
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:4, at 2-5 (arguing that "image differentiation" aids
consumers in rewarding high quality producers through repeat purchases) (quoting F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 378 (2d
ed. 1980)). Additionally, the consumer will not be able to buy consistently goods of the
same expected level of quality. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:5, at 2-8.
274. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246 (holding that the "issue of likelihood
of confusion does not arise ... until it is determined that the plaintiff has a trademark that
the law will protect"); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 9 (arguing that
"dual-use" of "March Madness" by IHSA and the NCAA will "cloud" each party's duties
and obligations).
275. See supra note 35 (discussing concurrent use rights).
276. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 248.
277. See id. at 247. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that IHSA's mark had been weak-
ened by the widespread media use. See id. at 246. "All trademarks are not equal," as
strong marks are given more protection over a broad range of goods and services, and
weak marks are given less protection and over a more narrow range. See 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 11:73, at 11-128.
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"March Madness" might extend well beyond goods relating to its basket-
ball tournament, such as to other basketball-related goods.2"8 Conse-
quently, it is unclear to whom another high school association should
turn for a license if it wants to use the term "March Madness."27 9 The
court's holding has left uncertain the trademark licensing activities of
both IHSA and the NCAA with respect to the mark, "March Mad-
ness."
28°
If a court grants "dual-use" rights to two parties, questions may arise
as to who will have the right and obligation to police use of the mark by
others.2 1 Each party's exercise or failure to exercise its rights may have
an effect on the strength of the mark and, as a result, the other party's1 82
rights. For example, one party's failure to take action against a third-
party use may undermine the strength of the "dual-use" mark.283 Fur-
thermore, one party's failure to prevent generic use of the "dual-use"
mark may cause the mark to lose all trademark significance for both par-
ties." Using the same reasoning, it is uncertain whether one party's
proper policing efforts will protect both users of the "dual-use" mark or
just one of themY5
278. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 27, at 9 (stating that there is uncertainty as
to who must police the marks on goods like basketballs).
279. See id. To date, the NCAA has filed three trademark applications to register
"March Madness." Search of LEXIS, TRDMRK Library, ALLTM File (Feb. 8, 1999).
Two of these applications are limited to goods and services related to college basketball.
See id. The third application is simply for sporting goods, namely basketballs and back-
boards. See id. All three applications currently are suspended. See id.
IHSA, on the other hand, has three registrations for "America's Original March Mad-
ness." See id. It also has three applications for "March Madness" that currently are sus-
pended. See id. The IHSA also has one registration for "March Madness" which it pur-
chased from Intersport. See id; see also Brief of GTE Vantage, supra note 178, at 9-11
(discussing the circumstances surrounding the Intersport registration).
280. See Glen Elsasser, No Advantage for IHSA in "March Madness", Supreme Court
Stays Out of Trademark Battle, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1997, § 4, at 2 (discussing the licensing
activities of IHSA before the suit).
281. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 9.
282. See id.
283. See id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1; § 11:85, at 11-144 (discussing the re-
lationship between strength and third party use).
284. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 9; infra Part V.C.2 (dis-
cussing generic terms issues).
285. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 9.
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C. The Strength of Trademarks and Free Speech Concerns with "Dual-
Use" Terms
1. The First Amendment and Trademarks
Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act give trademark owners a
cause of action against infringers. 6 To be considered an infringer under
the Lanham Act, the defendant must have used the mark in connection
with goods or services.2 The Lanham Act does not address situations
where one uses a mark communicatively by expressing an idea or con-
veying a message and, consequently, not using the term "in commerce"
in connection with advertising goods and services.28
First Amendment protection is afforded to those using trademarks to
convey messages and not to those who merely sell products.29 The pro-
tections exist because "[t]rademarks [often] form an important part of
the public dialog on economic and social issues."2'9 Allowing the law to
restrict the use of trademarks that are used solely in a communicative
manner, would have a chilling effect on such dialog. 9 Consequently, a
trademark owner has no cause of action against public and non-
commercial use of its mark.292
2. Free Speech and Generic Terms
As evidenced by cases discussing generic terms, trademark owners
must be cautious when dealing with the media, book and dictionary pub-
lishers, and other non-commercial users that possess the ability to alter
286. See 15 U.s.c §§ 1114, 1125 (1994). Trademarks also often are protected by state
common law. See 1 MCCARTHY supra note 1, § 2:7, at 2-12.
287. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); see also supra notes 49-50 (quoting the language
of the statute).
288. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). There is also a broadcast exception to section
32(2) of the Lanham Act, which limits the ability of trademark owners to bring actions
against newpaper and magazine publishers, and other electronic communicators, in con-
nection with those entities' advertisements containing alleged trademark infringements.
See id. § 1114(2).
289. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1987)
(refusing to enjoin defendant's use of plaintiff's mark in a two page magazine article enti-
tled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog"); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 31:147, at 31-213 (stating that commercial speech receives less First Amendment protec-
tion than "political" or "social" speech). But see Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 1183, 1183, 1192-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining defendant's use of slogan
"Enjoy Cocaine" on posters bearing logo similar to Coca-Cola's logo).
290. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 31:146, at 31-213.
291. See id.
292. See infra Part V.C.3 (discussing free speech concerns with trademarks).
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the nature or strength of their trademark. There does not appear to be
294
any sure legal recourse, however, against these entities. Therefore,
trademark owners are forced to devise other means of convincing the
media and public to treat their trademarks properly. 29 To prevent a
mark from becoming generic, a trademark owner should ensure that its
mark is always used as an adjective and never as a noun or verb.296 To
accomplish this, trademark holders have trademark awareness cam-
paigns, aimed at consumers and the trade, designed to prevent these
popular misuses of their marks. 97
3. Free Speech and "Dual-Use" Trademarks
Prior to Illinois High School Ass'n, a trademark owner's only fear was
that public use might dilute its mark or transform its trademark into a
generic term.29  Now, in light of the Seventh Circuit's decision, trade-
mark owners also must be concerned with media or public use compro-
mising its exclusive trademark rights in favor of other parties. 299 The
court cautioned trademark owners to supplicate editors, journalists,
sportscasters, and the like from using their trademark to denote some-
293. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that dictionaries, newspapers, and magazine articles can contain evidence
of generic usage); Loctite Corp. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that press releases could evidence generic use). The presence of
a trademark in a dictionary is relevant, but not conclusive evidence of the genericness of
the term. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:13, at 12-28. Evidence of generic usage in
trade journals and magazines can be obtained from the NEXIS database service. See id. at
12-28 to 12-29.
294. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:28, at 12-67.
295. See id. (giving examples of how a trademark owner can seek to restrain media use
of its mark; such as letters to the editor, etc.).
296. See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 360 (2d ed. 1996).
297. See id. at 349-360. For example, Xerox Corporation sponsored a large advertising
campaign to advise people that "Xerox" was not a noun or verb. See id. at 354. The In-
ternational Trademark Association ("INTA") distributes an editorial package designed to
assist "authors, writers, journalists/editors, proofreaders, and fact checkers" with correct
use and spelling of trademarks. See INTA Trademark Checklist (last visited Feb. 9, 1999)
<http://plaza.interport.net/inta/tmchklst.htm>. The package contains a trademark check-
list containing almost "4,000 trademarks and service marks with their generic terms and
indicates capitalization and punctuation." Id.
298. See supra Part II.A (discussing generic terms and dilution).
299. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247-48 (7th Cir.
1996) (denying injunction because media use had weakened the mark), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1083 (1997); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 10-13. The Seventh Cir-
cuit emphasized that the "IHSA was not assiduous" in convincing CBS to stop referring to
the NCAA tournament as "March Madness." See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246.
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thing else.30 The court, however, did not consider whether supplicating
the media and public was feasible.""
Trademarks are not secure property rights like patents or copyrights.(u
Trademarks will lose their protection when the marks cease to function
as the identifiers of source.03 This may occur for any reason except "the
culpable conduct of the defendant."'31 Non-commercial media and public
use of a trademark will not be considered culpable; therefore, the trade-
mark owner is virtually powerless to prevent the media from using its
mark in a non-commercial manner.0 5 As a result, regardless of how "as-
siduous" the trademark owner is, its protected trademark rights ulti-
mately may "depend on the whims of the media."3 6
IHSA argued that the Seventh Circuit's decision "upsets the balance
between the protection afforded trademarks and ... [that] afforded to
non-commercial speech" under the First Amendment. IHSA also ar-
gued that prior to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Illinois High School
Ass'n, trademark owners "had [little] to fear from communicative, non-
commercial uses of their marks.""3 8 For instance, in Lucasfilm, the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia recognized that a trademark
could develop a new meaning outside of its function as a trademark.3°9
As long as the mark still functioned in the commercial context to identify
a source, the court would protect an owner from a confusingly similar
commercial use.310 The Seventh Circuit, however, used Lucasfilm to il-
300. See id.
301. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246 (refusing to speculate as to the merits
of a suit against CBS).
302. See id. (stating that property rights receive more protection than trademark
rights); see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (explaining that a
trademark "is not a copyright").
303. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the
importance of the source identifying function of trademarks).
304. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246 (stating that if the NCAA was respon-
sible for the weakening of IHSA's mark, IHSA might have a remedy).
305. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:28, at 12-67 (citing to Illinois High School
Ass'n). What is commercial and non-commercial use often will not be easy to determine.
See Graff, supra note 39, at C6 (stating that "[o]ften, trademarks are used in a manner that
has aspects of both commercial and noncommercial speech").
306. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246.
307. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 10.
308. See id. at 12.
309. See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.D.C. 1985); see also
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 31:150, at 31-218 (discussing Lucasfihn).
310. See Lucasfilm, 622 F. Supp. at 935; 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 31:150, at 31-
218. The court said that even though the plaintiff, Lucasfilm, could not enjoin the public
interest groups' non-commercial media use of "STAR WARS," "it would be equally un-
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lustrate that if this new meaning contained significance as a trademark in
favor of another entity, a court would not protect the plaintiff's mark
against the other entity's use.3" IHSA argued that the result compels
trademark owners to challenge all non-commercial use of their marks,
whether by economic influence or threat of suit.312 The feasibility of such
challenges remains to be seen because the law of "reverse confusion"
and dilution presently offers no sure remedy."' Additionally, this state of
affairs places a heavy burden on small trademark holders who may be
unable to wage a series of costly battles.1 4
VI. THE PROPER STANDARD TO BE APPLIED TO "DUAL-USE"
TRADEMARKS
In one respect, "dual-use" terms, as defined in Illinois High School
Ass'n, are not novel at all.31 When there is no confusion, the plaintiff
and defendant are always allowed to co-exist, resulting in "dual use" of a
trademark.316 The Seventh Circuit opinion did not address the issue of
consumer confusion, however, despite the fact that "dual-use" was al-
realistic and unfair to take from the lawful owner of a strong trademark his continued
right to its commercial use because others, beyond his control ... used the words of the
trademark as part of an on-going international political debate." Lucasfilm, 622 F. Supp.
at 935.
311. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247-48.
312. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 11. GTE Vantage re-
sponded by stating that the case was not about the First Amendment, and that under
IHSA's theory, "ASPIRIN" may be revived as a trademark because "the public had a
First Amendment right to call all pain-relievers 'ASPIRIN."' See Respondent's Brief, su-
pra note 27, at 18-19.
313. See Graff, supra note 39, at C6 (arguing that trademark owners may be able to
sue the media for generic use and dilution); supra Part II. (discussing dilution); see also
supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing reverse confusion).
314. See Wolfersberger, supra note 41, at 389 (arguing that IHSA could never protect
its mark under the Seventh Circuit formulation because it lacked the resources to fight the
national media).
315. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 15 (arguing that "dual-use" trademarks
are not novel).
316. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 16-17 (citing examples of "dual-uses" of
trademarks such as "RAMS" for pickups and St. Louis football players, and "AMEX" for
the American Stock Exchange and American Express). Support for this premise can be
found in the district court's opinion, where the court determined that there was no real
likelihood of confusion present. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., No. 96-
1119, at 100-03 (C.D. I11. March 20, 1996) (hearing on motion for preliminary injunction).
See also supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's likeli-
hood of confusion analysis). The rights of the IHSA and the NCAA to co-exist were sim-
ply a by-product of the NCAA winning on the issue of likelihood of confusion. See gener-
ally Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 16-17.
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lowed.3"
A. The Seventh Circuit Would Have Created Clearer Precedent Had it
Decided Illinois High School Ass'n on Likelihood of Confusion Grounds
The Seventh Circuit's opinion leaves many questions unanswered be-
cause the court did not provide any guidelines for other courts when con-
fusion likely would result from a grant of "dual-use" rights."' In lieu of
discussing the likelihood of confusion, the court put a premium on pro-
tecting effective communication by holding that the IHSA did not have a
trademark to protect against use by GTE Vantage.319 In this regard, two
questions remain: (1) did the Seventh Circuit intend to hold that a likeli-
hood of confusion was irrelevant in the "dual-use" situation; and (2) was
a lack of confusion presupposed when one party had acquired superior
recognition through public association?3 20 The court announced that it
would decide against trademark protection and assimilate "dual-use"
terms to generic terms.321 Generic terms are not protected as trade-
marks, 22 but arguably, "dual-use" trademarks, as created in Illinois High
School Ass'n, remain protected trademarks and, therefore, should be
protected from use that causes consumer confusion.3 23 Thus, any future
317. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the Seventh Circuit opinion's omission of analysis
regarding the likelihood of confusion).
318. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-48. The likelihood of confusion issue
was not before the court and furthermore, the court declined to "opine on the scope of the
trademark rights that either IHSA or NCAA ha[d]" to the mark "March Madness" be-
yond the rights of the parties to the basketball CD-ROM game that is sold in connection
with the NCAA basketball tournament, and to the NCAA tournament itself. See id.
319. See id. at 247.
320. See generally id. at 246 (stating that the issue of likelihood of confusion presumes
a trademark that the law will protect); see also Fletcher & Kera, supra note 26, at 797
n.122 (stating that being termed "dual-use" "depend[s] on the factors [i.e., lack of confu-
sion] that resulted in that classification").
321. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 247.
322. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:2, at 12-7 (stating that public policy dictates
that generic terms are part of the public domain and are not protected as trademarks).
323. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-48 (implying that IHSA still may have
a protectable right in some circumstances). The court held only that the IHSA did not
have a trademark to protect against use in connection with the NCAA tournament. See
id. Arguably, the term "March Madness" could be labeled generic with respect to basket-
ball tournaments and neither IHSA nor the NCAA would have any protectable rights in
the mark. See id. at 247 (stating that IHSA could not remove "March Madness" from the
"public domain;" thereby indicating that the term was free for all to use); Richards v. Ca-
ble News Network, Inc., 15 F. Supp.2d 683, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that Judge Posner
labeled "March Madness" as a generic term). However, this author and other commenta-
tors disagree with this proposition. See Fletcher & Kera, supra note 26, at 797 (classifying
"dual-use" as a type of valid trademark); Lazar & Volz, supra note 25, at C5 (stating that
the Seventh Circuit "acknowledge[d] that the mark ["March Madness"] was not devoid of
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case characterizing a mark as a "dual-use" term needs to address the is-
sue of likelihood of confusion.324
In future "dual-use" terms cases, courts must strike a careful balance
between protecting effective communication and the likelihood of confu-
sion that might result if both marks are allowed to coexist.3 25 The first
step always should be a determination of whether the mark is a "dual-use"termor ageneic " 326
use" term or a generic term. If the mark is generic, the inquiry ends
value to either the NCAA or the IHSA"); Stanley, supra, note 25, at 1025 (arguing that
IHSA and the NCAA had retained trademark rights to "March Madness"). Also, based
on their briefs before the Supreme Court, it appears that the parties believed that both
IHSA and the NCAA had some protectable rights in the "March Madness" mark. See
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 7-9 (arguing that IHSA must now share
its trademark rights with the NCAA); Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 9 (arguing
that the public association created rights in "March Madness" in favor of the NCAA).
Additionally, one case, Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 1401, 1409, 1410 (E.D. Mo. 1997), seemed to accept that trademark rights could be
acquired through media and public resulting in a "dual-use" mark. In Dream Team, the
defendant attempted to argue that it had rights to the mark "Dream Team" via public as-
sociation. See id. at 1409. However, the court held that Illinois High School Association
was not applicable because the defendants in Dream Team were responsible for the the
public association along with the media. See id. at 1410.
324. See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the
likelihood of confusion analysis in future "dual-use" terms cases); infra Part VI.B (dis-
cussing what courts must do in future "dual-use" cases).
325. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-75 (1977)
(recognizing that conflicts between ownership rights in intellectual property and interests
in free expression must be resolved by balancing the competing interests involved); Rob-
ert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis,
72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1112-16 (1986) (discussing Zacchini and formulating a balancing test
to be used with trademark parody issues).
Courts also should balance the equities involved. A court should look at the manner in
which the defendant acquired its public association: whether it was active in creating the
public association, and therefore culpable; or whether it did not have any part in creating
the public association. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-47. If the defendant
was culpable, the doctrine of reverse confusion should apply, and no "dual-use" rights
should be granted. See id. Courts also must look at the plaintiff's conduct to determine
whether it took steps to prevent its mark from being associated with another entity. See
id. at 246. A court might be less sympathetic if the plaintiff took no action and failed to
ask the defendant or the public and media to stop misusing its mark. See id. (chastising
IHSA for not being "assiduous" in protecting its mark).
326. Cf Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246. The court stated that the issue of
likelihood of confusion does not arise until it is determined that the plaintiff has a trade-
mark that the law will protect. See id. A generic term cannot be protected as a trademark.
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:2, at 12-7 to 12-8 (discussing the public policy rea-
sons for not protecting generic terms as trademarks); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 12:30, at 12-68 (discussing the difficulty of reclaiming generic terms from the public do-
main). But see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding
that, although "Singer" had previously been held to be a generic designation for a certain
class of sewing machines, it had been recaptured as a trademark by continuous and exclu-
sive use and through advertising).
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• 327
and the mark cannot be protected. However, in determining whether
the mark is a "dual-use" term, courts should consider whether the party
advancing "dual-use" rights was culpable. Prior conduct that is culpable
in nature, such as actually using another's mark in commerce without le-
gal authority, should not form the basis for "dual-use" rights;328 it should
form the basis of a finding of infringement by "reverse confusion.
3 29
B. What Courts Should Do if There Is a Substantial Likelihood of
Confusion Between "Dual- Use" Marks of Equal Strength
Once the court has determined that "dual-use" rights have been estab-
lished, the court should apply the likelihood of confusion factors to de-
termine the possible extent of confusion that "dual-use" might entail.330
If there is a substantial likelihood of confusion in balancing the equities
involved, a court should grant "dual-use" rights and provide a judicial
order tailored to each individual case.33" ' Such an order must detail how
each dual user may use the mark to prevent or minimize any possible
• 332
confusion in the marketplace: For example, a court may order that a
house mark or logo be prominently displayed along with the mark in
question.333 A court also could require a defendant to use a disclaimer of
327. But see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:51, at 12-99 (stating that some injunctive
relief may be appropriate even with generic terms). Sometimes a mark that is held to be
primarily generic may be recognized by some as a trademark. See id. at 12-98 to 12-99
(stating that, although "ASPIRIN" was generic to the public, it was not to pharmacists).
In these situations, courts may approve an injunction that recognizes the dual nature of
the mark by requiring the defendant always to use its mark along with the generic term.
See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Ind., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963),
decree modified by 320 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Conn. 1970).
328. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 99 F.3d at 246-47 (stating that culpable conduct on
the part of the defendant is required for liability for reverse confusion).
329. See id.
330. See Fletcher & Kera, supra note 26, at 797 n.122 (stating "that to categorize a
mark [as a 'dual-use' term] produces no readily identifiable consequences," because "Ithe
consequences of being a 'dual use' term depend on the factors that led to the classifica-
tion"); see also supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood of
confusion factors).
331. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979) (balanc-
ing the conflicting interests of both the plaintiff and defendant in the continued use of
their marks and the need for the public to be free from confusion, before concluding to
issue a limited mandatory injunction); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:3, at 30-8
(discussing balancing the equities by way of a qualified injunction tailored to each individ-
ual case).
332. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:3, at 30-8 to 30-9.
333. See, e.g., AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 354-55 (requiring that the defendant's logo be
present on "all advertisements, signs, and promotional materials" to alleviate any possible
confusion).
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association, stating that the defendant is not in any way associated with
the plaintiff.'3
Although these methods often are criticized as being ineffective in al-
leviating confusion,335 they are perhaps the only way courts can address
the need for effective communication to prevent consumer confusion. In
fact, courts have issued similar injunctions in cases involving generic
marks where, because the term had at least some remaining trademark
significance, confusion might have ensued without such relief.336 Even if
"dual-use" marks are equated with generic marks and, thus, not entitled
to protection, arguably a similar injunction should issue if, for instance,
another party attempted to use "March Madness" for basketball-related
goods or services. In this regard, a court can promote effective commu-
nication by allowing both parties to use the mark, and it also can prevent
any confusion through the use of an appropriate judicial order similar to
the qualified injunction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Public association plays a major role in the acquisition and loss of
trademark rights. Public and media use of trademarks can result in the
334. See, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1234
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff must use a disclaimer on its goods stating that it
does not manufacture or sell footwear and "that it is not associated with the makers of
MUSHROOMS footwear"), affd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
335. See Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding that use of defendant's trade name might increase confusion because con-
sumers might think that there was a licensing agreement between the parties); T & T Mfg.
Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449 F. Supp. 813, 822 (D.R.I. 1978) (holding that adding a house
mark may only confuse consumers into thinking that the infringer is selling with the
authorization of the owner of the mark), affd, 587 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Martin
J. Beran, Likelihood of Confusion: Will That "House Mark" Get You "Home-Free"?, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 336, 361-63 (1993) (listing several guidelines to determine the weight
to be accorded to the presence of a house mark in the likelihood of confusion analysis).
The use of disclaimers also has been criticized. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Worldwide Entertainment Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 539, 541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(holding that a disclaimer helped prove likelihood of confusion rather than dispel confu-
sion); Marquis Who's Who, Inc. v. North Am. Adver. Assocs., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 139, 141,
143 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding a disclaimer insufficient), affd, 574 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation:
More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 54 (1986) (arguing that
consumer studies show that disclaimers are ineffective to protect against confusion).
336. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (detailing circumstances when a court
might issue an injunction in a case involving a generic mark with at least some trademark
significance).
337. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:3, at 30-8 to 30-9 (discussing balancing the
equities by way of a qualified injunction tailored to each individual case).
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trademark becoming diluted or generic. Such use can also result in
courts granting trademark rights in abbreviations and nicknames for
trademarks. Public and media use in favor of a third party can compro-
mise the trademark rights of a trademark owner and result in "dual-use"
rights. Such "dual-use" rights are in accordance with trademark prece-
dent; however, there are issues that will need to be dealt with in future
cases. The nature of a "dual-use" mark implies that it is used by more
than one unrelated entity. Therefore, courts must be cognizant of the
possibility of consumer confusion and the need for effective communica-
tion. In this regard, courts must balance these competing concerns by
framing an appropriate equitable judicial order. A court could mandate
that a "dual-use" mark always must be accompanied by a house mark,
logo, or disclaimer of association. In the end, it is possible to protect ef-
fective communication by recognizing "dual-use" rights while still favor-
ing trademark protection and preventing confusion.
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